Page:Nietzsche the thinker.djvu/285

Rh the remark that in all political questions, in the relation of parties as well, even of commercial or labor or employer parties, the questions are those of power—what one can and then what one should do; and the hint to the socialists, earlier referred to, that if they would have rights, they must first get power. The reconciling thought may be that relations of power, which are the ultimate foundation of rights and duties ordinarily arising through the media of contract, sometimes give rise to rights and duties directly, i.e., claims and corresponding obligations which do not rest on voluntary consent at all, but none the less come to be recognized as claims and obligations, and are practically so treated.undefined The view differs from the prevailing one and easily lends itself to abuse, and yet that Nietzsche does not mean to sanction any kind of self-assertion, is shown by his saying that "the worth of a man should prove what rights he may assume," and, still more strongly, that "the rights which a man assumes are in relation to the duties he sets himself, the tasks to which he feels he is grown." It is because we can effectually promise much, he says again, that we are given rights; and he holds that those who cannot promise (i.e., have not the right to, being slaves to appetite and the moment), should not have rights—an instance being the man with only cattle-like desires in his body, who "should not have the right to marry."

Our English word "justice" has jural connotations, so much so that Dewey and Tufts are led to say that "it is in the school of government and courts that man has learned to talk and think of right and law, of responsibility and justice." The German word, however, is "Gerechtigkeit," and Nietzsche thinks that the idea and accompanying sentiment are older than anything like organized civil society. His account of the matter is somewhat as follows: