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252 "schlecht" as with sacred groves; and the mass equally protect themselves by judging as they do. The two classes have, indeed, a different temper throughout. The valuations of the higher class are direct, active; those of the mass are rather from ressentiment or reactive. Also the happiness of the superior class is direct—it comes from a sense of the fullness of their power, joy in activity is a part of it; but for the lower class happiness is in rest from activity, something found in times of relaxation or when under some narcotic influence. Again, the superior let themselves go more, the lower are more calculating (klüger). The higher vent their anger straightway—it does not poison them and they easily forget (Mirabeau is a modern instance); they, if anybody, can love their enemies—they indeed want an enemy, one in whom there is nothing to despise and much to honor, and honoring is a way to loving; but the lower cherish their resentment, keeping it in secret places within them, and fear their enemy rather than honor him. undefined

It goes without saying that the contrast between the two classes and their moralities is within limits. The group as a whole must live, and what is helpful and harmful to it as a collectivity must have the first place. The sense of separateness of the higher class, their contempt for the lower, cannot go too far; and the mass, if they require protection and consideration and kindness too absolutely, will not give the services and make the sacrifices needed in time of war. In general, however, the group interests may be furthered rather than hindered by the differentiation into classes, with their respective points of view. It is a rudimentary kind of organization, and an organized mass is always stronger than a structureless one. Moreover, Nietzsche need not be supposed to mean that the classes and their moralities are marked off absolutely against each other; it is enough if, as the classes arise, they tend to take contrasted points of view—the moralities are types, schemata, not necessarily fully accomplished realities. And yet the contrasts are so great that not only is the good of the master-class not the good of the subject-class, but it may be the evil of the latter—the overflowing power of the ruler being just that which makes the subject afraid of him. A conqueror, for example, is always