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category of morality is good and evil. Every social group makes the distinction in some form; its power and life depend upon its doing so—it must favor what it feels to be helpful to it and oppose what is harmful, for good and evil have originally this utilitarian significance. So strong do the instinctive approbation and condemnation become that good is easily regarded as good per se and evil as evil per se—that is, the relativity of the conceptions is forgotten, and a chasm is put between them. Good becomes something eternally different from evil; there is no passing of one into the other, particularly of evil into good. In other words, a moralistic scheme of things, an incipient metaphysics tends to arise; and just the most earnest and idealistic moral natures go this way. The view is one which we have seen Nietzsche questioning in his previous period, but the questioning is now more extended and thoroughgoing. It is difficult to separate here his analysis from his conclusions, and I shall scarcely attempt to. His view of evil I shall particularly consider; what he says of good will be taken up more at length later.

The word he commonly uses is böse. It is not the same as übel (which implies a more general and perhaps more objective judgment), or as schlecht (which more or less savors of contempt). Professor Riehl remarks that böse is a peculiarly German word, wanting in other Aryan languages. In any case it has a peculiar shade of meaning, to which it is well to attend. The idea is of active harmfulness, along with intent to harm (real