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Rh to the herd-law), he seemed to the rest evil. On so deep and ancient a foundation does morality rest, in his view. He virtually defines moral actions as organic functions of individuals, in which not the individual, but a higher principle is the aim. Still more concisely, "Morality is the herd-instinct [ruling] in the individual." undefined

As to the content of morality, Nietzsche goes little beyond what we have already found him saying in his second period. The mores of different groups vary widely, and superficially nothing may seem constant in morality but its form. Yet there are certain mores which tend to arise everywhere. While any mos is better than none—a great proposition with which, Nietzsche says, civilization begins —some kinds of behavior are so necessary to social life that norms corresponding to them are practically universal. If men injure one another, lie to one another, if they do not to some extent help one another, they can hardly form a group at all. Animal society itself rests on something like love, constancy of affection, education of the young, labor, economy, courage, obedience on the part of the weaker, protecting care on the part of the stronger, sacrifice among all. No society can maintain itself without such qualities, and in those continuing the impulses become hereditary. Sympathy (Mitgefühl) a factor in social formations, the readiness of men to aid one another and have understandings a condition of life—such is Nietzsche's point of view. To however slight an extent, rudiments of "mutual consideration, pity, reasonableness, mildness, reciprocity of services" make their appearance. "Peaceable, reasonable, moderate, modest, considerate, chaste, honest, true, loyal, pitiful, dutiful, obedient,