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204 and there one for whom a morality is refuted, if its origin in utility is shown. Now an action is held in esteem because it comes hard to the doer, and now one because it is done easily; one action is valued because it is unusual, another because it is customary; one, because a man thereby shows his regard for his best good, another because he does not think of himself at all; one because it is duty, another because it is inclination; one because it is instinct, another because it is clearest reason. There is another list of contrarieties, covering somewhat the same ground, but adding the following particulars: we call a mild conciliatory person good, but also one who is brave, unbending, and strict; we call the unconditional friend of truth good, but also the man of piety who transfigures things; we call one who obeys himself good, but also one who is devout; we call the superior, the noble man good, but also one who does not despise or look down; we call a good-natured man, one who avoids strife good, but also one who is eager for strife and victory; we call one who will ever be first good, but also one who wishes no precedence over others. In other words, there are different moralities in us today, different standards and ideas of good. And not only do men disagree with one another, but individuals disagree with themselves, now judging from one standard of valuation and now from another. We are really a kind of mishmash (this is to Nietzsche one of the characteristic marks of modernity)—we are so intellectually and we are perhaps so physically, differing races and old-time social castes being mingled in us. We are not without moral feeling, we have an immense fund of it, immense force, but no common aim in the pursuit of which this may be turned to account. undefined How to transcend the present moral anarchy becomes a driving motive with Nietzsche, particularly in this last period of his life.