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198 power strives for), but to dominate by incorporating, by making the foreign substance of power an integral, though subordinate, part of itself. This is manifest in hunger and the overt acts of seizure—the living thing perhaps takes more than it can actually appropriate. Exploiting, stealing belongs thus to its nature. According life is radically misconceived when it is taken as mere adaptation to environment; "adaptation" is something secondary—is reaction, while life is action, activity itself (self-activity, one might say, though Nietzsche does not use the phrase—he does say "spontaneous" activity)—activity positive, aggressing, an "attacking, encroaching, freshly-interpreting, freshly-directing and shaping" force. To be controlled by outer conditions, or mere accommodation to them, is, for Nietzsche, a sign of decadence—he thinks that Darwin and Spencer both overvalue outer conditions in their view of life. undefined Indeed, as he conceives the matter, life wants opposing outside forces—wants them to feel its power over them. In this way he interprets the pseudopodia of lower forms of life: the living substance is reaching out after something on which to expend its power, and appropriation is merely the consequence. And when it appropriates more than it can really control, it proceeds to divide itself—as two, it can still control. There is, however, no "altruism" in the process. As "nourishment" is something secondary, the original impulse being simply the will to close in on whatever is at hand, so self-division or propagation is equally derived—where one will does not suffice to organize what has been appropriated, another arises. undefined Structure, organization, is another result: it is necessary to the end of disposing of what has been appropriated—its meaning is arranging, ordering, putting in place to the end of dominance and use. Incident to all life is power that commands and power that obeys—whatever does not command must