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Rh not even raised—so that, if Schopenhauer's system is metaphysics in the second or highest degree, Nietzsche's is so only in the first; still it is metaphysics so far as this means a transcending of experience and the phenomenal realm in general. Certain positivist writers regard Nietzsche as going backward—reversing in his procedure Comte's law of the three stages.

The starting-point is, as I have said, man. The bottom thing in him is his impulsive, willing nature. Each impulse, indeed, would rule if it could—the human problem being to establish an order of rank or precedence between them. Mind itself is of a commanding nature—wants to rule. Philosophy, which seeks to arrange, grasp, comprehend the world and establish values in it, is the most sublimated form of the will to power. One who thinks that philosophy has nothing to do with power should grapple with a philosophical problem, or with Nietzsche himself—and see whether power is needed. Nietzsche regards the scientific specialist as a tool—a precious one, one of the most precious that exists—but a tool in the hands of one more powerful than he, the philosopher. The philosopher is the Cæsarian trainer and strong man of culture. The saint is interpreted in similar terms. He is commonly thought to turn his back on power, but he is a supreme type of power, and of the will to it, according to Nietzsche. He is revered by the mightiest—why? Because, Nietzsche answers, they feel in presence of one of their own kind—whose power, however, turns inward rather than outward. Even love is an exercise of power—it gives the highest feeling of power; and Jesus, in telling his disciples to call no one master, really recommended a very proud life under the form of a poor and serving one. Nietzsche thinks that the sense of power is what in varying form we all crave, that the love of power is a central, universal instinct: he defines psychology as a doctrine of the development