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152 put every one into a corner and speciality. "What I wish is that the genuine concept of the philosopher shall not entirely perish in Germany." undefined Nietzsche even goes to the length of questioning whether there are any bare facts separable from interpretation of some kind, whether it is possible, as some propose, to stand by the facts simply and not go beyond them—he does not think much of the idea of putting philosophy "upon a strictly scientific basis."

Moreover, facts have to be valued as well as ascertained—and it appears to be his opinion that the ultimate canon for interpreting, relating, and ordering is derived from the valuing process. The valuing attitude is sharply contrasted with the "scientific" one. It is not a mere mirroring of the facts, and Nietzsche draws a satirical picture of the "objective" man who mirrors everything and is nothing—presque rien. It involves choosing, preferring, judging of facts—that is, a standard which is independent of them and is projected by the mind. Zarathustra accordingly is represented as having left the house of scholars who only want to observe; the present age seems to him one of polyglot knowledge, not one of belief and creative capacity. This prostrating oneself before facts, without standards by which to judge of them, has become a sort of cultus—Nietzsche admits that Taine is an example of it. The only explanation of it is that men have been long happy in the unreal and are now surfeited with it. Positivism is a rebound against Romanticism, the work of undeceived romanticists. But to love the real, irrespective of its quality and character, is to be tasteless. Zarathustra does not like those to whom each and every thing is good and this world the best world—he honors rather refractory, fastidious tongues and stomachs that have learned to say "I," and "Yes" and "No." The trouble with