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116 superfluous. The consequences are far from agreeable in some cases. For example, responsibility goes, and he calls it a bitter drop—"the bitterest which one bent on knowing must swallow." Through feelings of responsibility man has lifted himself out of his animality; it was a necessary illusion ("Moral ist Nothlüge"). Yet the conclusion is inevitable: without freedom, no responsibility. We are as responsible for our dreams as for our waking conduct—that is, we are responsible for neither. Cruel men are no more responsible for what they do, than granite is for being granite. Guilt also goes. Although judges of witches and witches themselves have been convinced of their guilt, there was no guilt, and it is so with guilt of every kind. Desert of praise or blame goes (which is not saying that either may not be dealt out for effect); undefined and so with praising and blaming ourselves. Bad conscience is like a dog biting against a stone—a stupidity. Giving way to remorse is to add to our first folly a second; if we have done harm, let us do good—this is the better way. undefined Indeed, things being necessarily what they are, "wrong" in any absolute sense disappears from the universe, and "ought," as contradictory to what is, becomes meaningless. All actions are innocent; even the emancipated individual who becomes "pious" again (a type Nietzsche particularly dislikes) only does what he has to do—though it may be a sign of degeneration going on within him. Revolutionary and more or less unwelcome as all this is, Nietzsche sees compensations, and in some ways has a sense of relief—for the dark shadow of sin vanishes and the world is clothed in innocence again. Later on he says along this same general line, though with a special shade of meaning [he has been speaking of the liberating effect of comparative studies], "We understand all, we experience all, we have no longer `