Page:Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc. (11th Cir. 2023).pdf/8



The defendants’ argument begins and ends with Petrella. Specifically, the defendants invoke the following quotes. The Supreme Court said that “Section 507(b) … bars relief of any kind for conduct occurring prior to the three-year limitations period.” 572 U.S. at 667, 134 S.Ct. 1962. And the Court said that the import of the statute of limitations is that a copyright plaintiff can get damages “running only three years back from the date the complaint was filed.” Id. at 672, 134 S.Ct. 1962. Because the statute of limitations already protects defendants from stale claims, the Court held that it was unnecessary to apply the equitable doctrine of laches.

We do not read these snippets from Petrella to create a three-year lookback period or a damages cap. We cannot read a court’s opinion like we would read words in a statute. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 385, 101 S.Ct. 2813, 69 L.Ed.2d 706 (1981) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979)); United States v. Garges, 46 F.4th 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2022); Romo v. Largen, 723 F.3d 670, 678 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring). Instead, when interpreting and applying words in a judicial opinion, we must consider the context, such as the question the court was answering, the parties’ arguments, and facts of the case. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 341, 99 S.Ct. 2326 (examining the language of a judicial opinion “in context”). Reading these statements in context, we are confident that the Court did not cap copyright damages for claims that are timely under the discovery rule.

For starters, Petrella did not present the question whether a plaintiff could recover for harm that occurred more than three years before the plaintiff filed suit if his claim was otherwise timely under the discovery rule. The question in Petrella was “whether the equitable defense of laches (unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit) may bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within § 507(b)’s three-year limitations period.” Petrella, 572 U.S. at 667, 134 S.Ct. 1962. The plaintiff in Petrella “sought no relief for conduct occurring outside § 507(b)’s three-year limitations period.” 572 U.S. at 668, 134 S.Ct. 1962. But the defendant nevertheless argued that laches barred the plaintiff’s claim because it was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendant to allow the plaintiff to sue eighteen years after the defendant allegedly began infringing the plaintiff’s copyright. Id. at 674–75, 134 S.Ct. 1962. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument and held that laches could not bar a copyright claim that was otherwise timely under the statute of limitations. Id. at 667, 134 S.Ct. 1962.

In passing on the question presented, the Court reasoned that the defense of laches was unnecessary because the statute of limitations already protects putative defendants from stale claims. But the Court made its statements in the context of a claim that was timely because of the injury rule. And, as we have already explained, the plaintiffs’ claims in this case are timely because of the discovery rule, not the injury rule. This distinction is important for two reasons.

First, the Court’s statements in Petrella merely describe the operation of the injury rule on the facts of that case and others like it. The Court in Petrella explained that, under the injury rule, separate claims accrue with each new injury. Id. at 670–72, 134 S.Ct. 1962. The injury rule and sepa­rate-accrual rule mean, as the Court said, that a separate copyright claim accrues “[e]ach time an infringing work is reproduced or distributed.” Id. at 671, 134 S.Ct. 1962. Because the claim accrues “at the time the wrong occurs,” the statute of limitations protects putative defendants