Page:Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc. (11th Cir. 2023).pdf/7

 the works would have infringed MSI and Nealy’s copyrights. The defendants also contend, like the Webster defendant, that they are not liable because a third party owns the copyrights and licensed them to the defendants. Accordingly, Webster controls, and the discovery rule governs the timeliness of MSI and Nealy’s claims.

The district court applied the discovery rule and concluded that there was a genuine issue of fact about when the plaintiffs knew or should have known about their claims. We will assume for the purposes of answering the district court’s certified question that the district court’s summary judgment ruling on this point was correct. And so, assuming the plaintiffs’ claims are timely under the discovery rule, we turn to the question whether the plaintiffs may recover retrospective relief for infringement that occurred more than three years before they filed this lawsuit.

The defendants rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella to support their contention that MSI and Nealy may not recover for infringement that occurred more than three years before they filed this suit. In Petrella, the Supreme Court held that the equitable doctrine of laches does not bar copyright claims that are timely within the three-year limitations period because Section 507(b) “itself takes account of delay.” Petrella, 572 U.S. at 670–72, 677, 134 S.Ct. 1962. The Court identified several reasons that it was unnecessary to apply the doctrine of laches to copyright claims. One of those reasons, the Court said, was that “Section 507(b) … bars relief of any kind for conduct occurring prior to the three-year limitations period.” Id. at 667, 134 S.Ct. 1962. The Court explained that, by dint of the statute of limitations, retrospective relief is available to a copyright plaintiff “running only three years back from the date the complaint was filed.” Id. at 672, 134 S.Ct. 1962.

The circuits are split on the meaning of Petrella. The Second Circuit has held that, even under the discovery rule, a copyright plaintiff may not recover for infringement occurring more than three years before the plaintiff filed suit. Sohm, 959 F.3d at 49–50. The Second Circuit recognized that its ruling undermines the discovery rule: a copyright plaintiff could have a timely claim under the discovery rule but no available relief. But it felt itself bound by the Court’s statements in Petrella. More recently, the Ninth Circuit split with the Second Circuit and held that Petrella does not mean that a plaintiff cannot recover for infringement that occurred more than three years before the filing of an otherwise timely suit under the discovery rule. Starz Ent., 39 F.4th at 1242–44. The court reasoned that an absolute three-year bar on damages “would eviscerate the discovery rule.” Id. at 1244. And the court explained that reading Petrella to impose such a rule would mean that the Petrella Court ignored the plain text of Section 507(b), which “limits civil actions to ‘three years after the claim accrued’ ” and says nothing about remedies. Id. at 1245 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)).

We agree with the Ninth Circuit and hold that a copyright plaintiff may recover retrospective relief for infringement occurring more than three years before the lawsuit’s filing so long as the plaintiff’s claim is timely under the discovery rule. This is so for two reasons, which we discuss in turn. First, we believe Petrella’s statements about the availability of relief are directed to the way the statute of limitations works when claims accrue under the injury rule, not the discovery rule. Second, the text of the Copyright Act does not place a time limit on remedies for an otherwise timely claim.