Page:Nealy v. Atlantic Recording.pdf/7

 deposition testimony, Plaintiff states both that he signed the agreement, and that he did not sign the agreement. Such inconsistency is not sufficient to create a ‘genuinely disputed’ issue of fact if only because a statement against [one’s] interest trumps one which is self-serving.”).

Without establishing that MSP had no legal existence apart from MSI and was no more than an assumed name, Plaintiffs cannot receive the benefit of a presumption of legal ownership based on the copyright registrations for the MSP-Registered Songs. See ''Architectural Body Rsch. Found. v. Reversible Destiny Found.'', 335 F. Supp. 3d 621, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“If the plaintiff is not named on the registration as the owner, it has the additional burden of proving valid chain of title.”) (internal quotation omitted). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have not shown ownership of the MSP-Registered Songs, which Plaintiffs must establish both for standing and as an element of their copyright infringement case. See Urbont v. Sony Music Ent., 831 F.3d 80, 88, n.6 (2d Cir. 2016).

'II. Whether Petrella limits damages to the three-year period prior to the lawsuit'

Plaintiffs next object to Magistrate Judge Becerra’s finding that Plaintiffs are limited to damages incurred during the three years prior to filing their lawsuit. Plaintiffs insist that the language in Petrella suggesting a strict three-year damages bar is dicta and that the discovery rule operates as an exception to the general rule barring recovery for infringements prior to the three-year window. See Pls.’ Obj. at 10–15.

The Court disagrees. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this specific issue, the Court finds—as the Second Circuit held in Sohm v. Scholastic Inc., 959 F.3d 39 (2d Cir.