Page:Nealy v. Atlantic Recording.pdf/12

 compositions at issue in this case (“Crane Meeting”). Defs.’ Obj. at 12. Defendants argue that at the Crane Meeting, Nealy learned that Butler had licensed the works to Crane’s companies, and that Plaintiffs’ actual notice of Butler’s adverse ownership claim establishes that Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are time-barred. Id. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs had constructive notice of their claims based on the widespread distribution of several of the works at issue in this case. Id. at 14–15. Third, Defendants argue that the fact that Plaintiffs were not consistently receiving royalties for the songs at issue in this case should have caused Plaintiffs to investigate violations of their ownership rights. Id. at 16–17. Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should have known about adverse ownership claims based on Broadcast Music, Inc.’s (“BMI”) public records—which showed Warner Chappell was claiming to administer the songs—and a September 2015 BMI royalty statement that Nealy received for the song “Fix It In The Mix,” which identified Warner Chappell as administrator. Id. at 16–18.

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with Defendants that Magistrate Judge Becerra applied the “express repudiation” standard rejected in Webster. Magistrate Judge Becerra analyzed when Plaintiffs knew or should have known that Defendants were challenging their ownership of the musical works at issue. She considered the Crane Meeting and found that Crane’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ ownership did not necessarily put Plaintiffs on notice that the Defendants in this case were challenging their ownership rights. See Rep. at 38. She also analyzed DefendantsDefendants’ [sic] arguments regarding widespread dissemination, royalties, and the BMI statement and determined that “reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from [the] undisputed facts, namely whether Nealy had reason to know that Defendants were infringing.” Id. at 38–41. In reaching this conclusion, Magistrate Judge Becerra took into account that Plaintiff was incarcerated from March 1989 to March 2008 and then again from February 2012 to September 2015. She reasoned