Page:Nation v71 no1832.djvu/1



The Commission headed by Judge Taft, it is announced, has organized a civil government for the Philippines, to go into operation on the 1st of September. The Commission will be the Legislature of the islands, and it must also be the executive and the judiciary. It may appoint judges, but they will necessarily be subordinate to the Commission and will be removable at its pleasure. The laws which it ordains will be enforced by our troops and it will be hard for the Filipinos to discover how their condition has been altered. They can hardly be persuaded that they are governing themselves, and if they are not, they are probably indifferent to the titles which their rulers bear. The only sign of progress that is discoverable is the report that Judge Taft is examining the heads of the religious orders concerning their estates, and finds that the extent of their claims is smaller than was supposed. If this be true, some settlement of a very difficult question may be feasible.

Gen. MacArthur reports the capture of a small body of American troops by the Filipinos at a place not far from Manila, a loss insignificant in itself, but showing how precarious our position is. At the War Department the occurrence is regarded as a proof that the insurrection is still in a fairly organized condition, and that Gen. MacArthur's objections to the withdrawal of troops from the Philippines were well founded. Indeed, the War Department is said to believe that the effect of withdrawing two or three regiments for service in China has been to encourage the enemy to renew active operations. The conduct of the officer commanding the band of Filipinos which inflicted this reverse on our arms appears to have been highly honorable. He returned to us the wounded American soldiers, and assured us that the prisoners should be well treated. Such behavior is hardly to be reconciled with the hypothesis that the only Fillpinos opposed to our rule are robbers and cutthroats,

Secretary Hay's straightforward reply to Li Hung Chang's suggestion that, if the allies would not march on Pekin, the foreign Ministers there might be sent, under safe escort, to Tientsin, ought to have brought the Chinese Government to its senses, if any diplomatic communication could. Secretary Hay declared, in clear and unmistakable language, that "this Government will not enter into any arrangement regarding the disposition or treatment of the legations without first having free communication with Minister Conger"; that "the responsibility for their protection rests upon the Chinese Government"; and that if that Government can deliver the Ministers at Tientsin, it can open the direct communication with them which is insisted upon. Nothing could be in less need of construction or interpretation than this. It hardly needs to be pointed out, of course, that such a declaration of policy practically amounts to an ultimatum on the part of this Government. Until the demand of the United States is granted, diplomacy has in this direction no further field.

It is regrettable that, just as the allied forces are beginning their advance upon Pekin, news should be received of an alarming prevalence of sickness among the American troops. The Ninth Infantry, perhaps the best regiment we had in the Philippines, and presumably a first-rate example of the "well-seasoned troops" which the United States was to employ in China, reports a sick list of 257. If we add the 140, or thereabouts, which this regiment lately lost in battle, we have a total of about 400 men to be deducted from the regiment's effective strength. The sick list, of course, bears an extremely large proportion to the whole, and could prove disquieting to the public mind. With the dreadful experiences of the Spanish war to guide us. and with the army in much readier condition for the field than in 1898, there has seemed good reason to hope that the story of disease, whether epidemic or climatic, would not be repeated, but that the health of the troops would be abundantly safeguarded. The excessive amount of sickness does not, however, appear to disturb the officials of the War Department, who point out that Tientsin is an old and filthy city, without drainage or sanitation, and with a water-supply reeking with pollution and contagion. Under the circumstances, and considering the change of climate, a sick list of 50 per cent. would not, they say, be surprising. It is to be hoped that present conditions may speedily improve, and that the preparation of field hospitals and hospital-ships and other medical and surgical supplies may prove adequate to the emergency.

In Mantchuria the Russians have open hostilities to deal with; and while their forces appear to be sufficient to hold the Chinese in check, a considerable body of troops is likely to be required in that quarter for some time yet. This means not only less effective coöperation with the other Powers in the concerted movement towards Pekin, but also a serious check to the progress of the railroad. Great Britain is reported to be assembling a strong fleet in the neighborhood of Shanghai, not only for the protection of its own interests there, but also as a safeguard against a possible hostile move by other Powers. From the interior come reports of massacres of native Christians, but most of these lack confirmation. Whatever its causes, however, there is every evidence that the ferment in the empire is widespread. Just at present, fortunately, the divided councils in the Chinese Government itself, together with the apparent friendliness of some of the viceroys for the foreigners, while complicating the situation, make, on the whole, for safety, by preventing the united action which foreign interests have most to fear.

The extent to which the coöperation of Japan can be counted on, by Europe and America, in the ultimate adjustment of the status of China, is a question likely to become of increasing interest. The fact that Japan, at the close of its late war with China, was deprived by the jealousy of the Powers of some of the fruits of victory to which it felt itself entitled, has encouraged the feeling that it would be only too glad, when the convenient season came, to subject its old enemy to further humiliation. The willingness of Japan to send troops to the disturbed region, and to lead, if desired, in the work of pacification, has received no end of applause and sounding commendation, while the remarkable preparedness of the Japanese forces has been in striking contrast to the imperfect equipment of the European contingents. Beyond the restoration of order, however, it is by no means clear that Japan can be counted on to join, as a matter of course, any "concert" which the other Powers may choose to arrange, especially if partition is a part of the programme, So far as can now be seen, the interest of Japan, with regard to both its internal peace and its foreign relations, is in preserving the Chinese territory and the Chinese Government intact. It has no reason to wish half-a-dozen foreign nations established at its doors, nor anything to gain from the international friction which would inevitably result. Moreover, notwithstanding the strides which Japan has taken in civilization, we must not forget that the Japanese have, at bottom, more points in common with the Chinese than with Europeans, and that their present activity does not necessarily exclude great sympathy for their antagonists. Doubtless, this sympathy will not tie their hands in the present emergency, but it is