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 incompetence, or imprisonment), the real party cannot advance the action, except where another person (the next friend) stands in and advances the cause on the actual party’s behalf. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161–66, 110 S.Ct. 1717.


 * A. The basics of next-friend standing.

The Supreme Court considers next-friend standing an “alternative basis” for standing in federal courts. Id. at 161, 110 S.Ct. 1717. Specifically, it has “long been an accepted basis for jurisdiction in certain circumstances.” Id. at 162, 110 S.Ct. 1717. These “certain circumstances” are deeply rooted in history and narrowly limited to: (1) habeas corpus actions; and (2) “infants, other minors, and adult mental incompetents.” Id. at 163, 163 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1717.

Next-friend standing allows a third-party to singularly advance a cause of action on another’s behalf. “A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the … action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the … real party in interest.” Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717. To invoke next-friend standing, the purported next friend must establish: (1) “an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action”; and (2) “the ‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Id. at 163–64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (internal citations omitted). I agree with the Majority that there is no question PETA did not allege—in any way—sufficient facts to establish it could be Naruto’s next friend.


 * B. Next-friend standing cannot apply to animals.

I also agree with the Majority that animals cannot be represented by a next friend; I write to expand on the reasoning provided in the Majority opinion.

The Supreme Court has clearly delineated the limits of next-friend standing: “[T]he scope of any federal doctrine of ‘next friend’ standing is no broader than what is permitted by … the historical practice.” Id. at 164–65, 110 S.Ct. 1717; cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, — [sic] U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 1811, 1818–19, 188 L.Ed.2d 835 (2014) (recognizing legislative prayer as a “historical” exception to the Establishment Clause); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26, 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 687 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill[.]” (emphasis added) ). The Supreme Court noted the two illustrations allowed by such “historical practice”: imprisoned individuals using habeas corpus and mental incompetents or minors. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161–63, 163 n.4, 110 S.Ct. 1717; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (codifying next-friend standing for habeas corpus actions; Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2) (permitting next-friend standing for a “minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative” (emphasis added) ) ). However, there is no historical evidence that animals have ever been granted authority to sue by next friend and, absent an act of Congress, it