Page:NTSB Southern Airways Flight 932 report.pdf/28

 such a presumption is far more likely than the explanation that the runway environment was sighted, but that such sighting was either sufficiently obvious to negate the need for a callout or was indicated and acknowledged by nonverbal signals.

The recorded conversion also indicated that the crew was not aware that the aircraft had descended below MDA. The first officer's comment at 1935:06.8 ("We're two hundred above") is most logically construed as a reference to MDA. The following comment by the charter coordinator (Bet'll be a missed approach") can be taken to mean that the flight was approaching MDA, yet the runway environment was still not in sight. The next statement on the recorder ("Four hundred") most probably means that the aircraft had reached MDA, which is 400 feet above the airport elevation. Such an interpretation is consistent with the following remark of the captain ("that the approach?"), which indicates that he was asking, perhaps rhetorically, whether they had reached the farthest point ot which the flight could legally descend. The first officer responded "Yeah," which again implies that the MDA had been reached and the runway environment was not in sight. The available evidence also indicates that a level off or missed-approach was then initiated. The swath cut through the trees, ground witness statements, and the flight recorder altitude trace all show that the descent was stopped, power was added, and a gradual climb was commenced. Furthermore, the first officer callout out airspeed in terms of a number ("Hundred and twenty-six") instead of a reference speed("bug plus - - -"), which is indicative of a go-around rather than a continuing approach.

In the view of the foregoing, the Board concludes that the crew never sighted the runway environment and was not aware that the flight had descended through actual MDA.

From a study of the conversation and activities reflected by the voice recorder, it is apparent that, while the approach was conducted in a systematic manner, the crew deviated from some of the required procedures. With respect to required callouts, there was no mention that the gear was down and locked by either pilot. The first officer did not call 500 feet above the field elevation with a check of instrument flags, speed, and rate of descent as required on the Before Landing Final Checklist. There was a call, "We're two hundred above," but this did not preclude the required