Page:NTSB Report, 1967 Lear Jet crash.pdf/16

- 13 - quality control normally afforded a production aircraft, or the inspection of all items normally provided a service aircraft. At this point the FAA-Designee Authorized Inspector and the test pilot both assumed the aircraft to be a production test aircraft, which required a much more extensive testing program than a service aircraft. The Designee released the aircraft for test flight only and the test pilot, on the third attempt, finally completed the major items of safety during a two-hour test hep, but still considered the aircraft in a test status only. It is significant that Pilot David was advised of the status of the aircraft and in fact advised the test pilot that he would fly the aircraft locally himself on the next flight. However, as a result of inadequate intra-company coordination on the work, inspection, and flight testing of the aircraft, it was improperly decided to utilize N804LJ for transportation of a company official.

Except for the reference to a possible yaw damper difficulty, the flight to Detroit and the return portion progressed normally until approximately 1933. At this time the aircraft was cruising at FL 250, presumably in the clear but experiencing moderate turbulence. The flight was proceeding on a heading of approximately 260 degrees, and in the process of switching to the newly assigned radio frequency. Before communication could be re-established the flight commenced an abnormally sharp turn to the right and disappeared from the radar scope.

At the time N804LJ disappeared from radar it was in the same general area as two flights which reported moderate turbulence. Although a third