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 through OJT without gaining knowledge of their operating strengths and weaknesses.

Moreover, in the absence of this documentation, Amtrak has no way to evaluate apprentices' progress in developing operating judgment and skills. Instructing engineers are also unable to assess apprentices' performance development level or deficiencies in operating skills until they actually observe the apprentices operating. The Safety Board urges Amtrak to revise its observation and evaluation procedures so that management and instructing engineers both have access to thorough documentation of apprentices' progress in all major learning activities. This information should also be available to each apprentice to provide feedback on his training. The Safety Board is concerned that Amtrak managers responsible for overseeing the training program seemed unaware that documentation was not being provided or used.

Amtrak also needs to improve internal communication and coordination among training activities. The investigation disclosed that most communication and coordination between activities administered by the engineer training school (classroom and simulator training) and those administered by the transportation department (physical characteristics familiarization and OJT) exist solely to facilitate scheduling, rather than ensure overall quality control of the training phase. The manager of engineer training indicated that the school does not participate in the advancement of apprentices after they leave the school other than to schedule their final qualification on the IIT simulator. He also said that he did not know whether the apprentice engineer on Amtrak train 66 was qualified on the territory.

The Safety Board does not view this inadequate coordination as inconsequential. For example, the apprentice who operated Amtrak train 66 had a low score on train handling proficiency on the IIT simulator. If the instructing engineer on Amtrak train 66 had been given this information before the trip, he may have supervised the apprentice more closely. Event recorder data from the locomotive showed that before the accident, the brake valve and throttle were improperly operated (that is, the throttle was in run 8 position when the full service brake application was made), and investigators determined that the engineer rather than the apprentice placed the train in emergency from the right side of the cab, albeit much too late. This sequence of events suggests that the engineer may have been surprised by the apprentice's use of the controls.

—The Safety Board is aware that computer-aided simulators, such as the IIT equipment used in the Amtrak engineer training program, have been increasingly accepted as training aids in the transportation industry. Simulators are very useful in addressing in a controlled environment operating behaviors that are either too dangerous to undertake using actual equipment or that must be evaluated more precisely than is possible through observation alone. To be most effective, this type of training must closely reproduce the conditions and operating tasks of the equipment being represented.

Amtrak uses the IIT simulator for training and assessment in the engineer training program. Safety Board investigators learned that neither the sections of track portrayed on the simulator nor the type of train equipment used correspond with Northeast Corridor operations. The Safety Board is concerned that Amtrak has not provided simulations that more closely conform to the operations that apprentices are expected to perform after they are promoted to engineer. To the