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-21- Crashworthiness

Since the sill section and floor plate of train No. 74 were 21.9 inches lower than the sill and floor of the freight locomotive unit of OPSE-7, the operating cab of the power car was not survivable in this accident. Penetration of the power car at this height above the floor plate insured failure of the cab's forward structure.

Although the I-beam forward posts of the power car were intended to be collision posts, they failed to provide any protection since they were torn loose and pushed rearward even in a relatively low speed collision. In the test mockup that was performed on the collision posts before they were installed in the power car, the collision posts were welded to an I-beam before the test loading was applied. (See appendix H.) The actual installation of these collision posts differed from the testing because they were welded only to the much thinner ﬂoor plate. In this accident, the collision posts tore loose from the floor plate, or tore the floor plate metal. It is evident that modern passenger equipment, such as that used on train No. 74, will always sustain extensive damage in a collision with conventional locomotives because of the incompatibility of the rigid frames; its frame being approximately 21 inches lower than standard railroad equipment. Apparently, this matchup was not considered when the turboliner equipment was adopted for use on American railroads.

The Safety Board identified the lack of crash protection provided the occupants of locomotives in an accident at Riverdale, Illinois, on September 8, 1970, and made a recommendation to the FRA for timely improvement of the crashworthiness of railroad equipment particularly as it is related to the protection of the occupants of locomotive control compartments. In a letter to the Safety Board dated May 3, 1971, the FRA outlined its concern for this problem and set up a meeting with the locomotive and car builders, labor organizations, carriers, and the AAR. (See appendix I.) On January 16, 1973, the FRA adviSed the Safety Board that a locomotive control compartment committee had been organized, that the AAR had requested a contractor to design a program of testing to determine locomotive cab crashworthiness, and that the test program would set requirements for anticlimbing devices and design requirements for locomotive crash posts and pilots. However, this committee, still in existence, has not published any minimal criteria for the structural design of locomotives. Since the original meeting in 1971 with the FRA, numerous accidents have been investigated by the Safety Board in which crashworthiness and collision posts have been identified as inadequate to provide protection to the occupants of locomotive control compartments. Amtrak apparently gave little consideration to crashworthiness in the design and adaptation of the turboliner power cars as demonstrated by the extensive damage done to the locomotive cab in this relatively low speed collision. The damage to the cab would have made it unsurvivable for the occupants if they had remained in the cab. The acquisition of this lighter and lower turboliner equipment was possible because of the lack of design requirements established by the FRA for locomotive construction.