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-20- The dispatcher had been working regularly on his assignment for about 1 year 6 months and had been regularly issuing train orders to operators without requiring them to display the train order signal and confirm it with the statement required by the rules. This practice was also being followed by the dispatcher when he was an operator and he could not display a train order signal. The CW operator stated that in his year's experience, he had been led tobelieve through on—the—job training that it was acceptable to state to the dispatcher, "BDA," and then copy the train order before applying the blocking device. That is contrary to the intent of the required exchange between an operator and a dispatcher which is to insure that a blocking device is applied and confirmed before the order is transmitted. '

The Conrail management had to have known if they have been performing periodic inspections, that improper procedures were being used, such as no train order signals being displayed at towers because the operators did not have the ability to do so. Thus, it seemed a fair inference that Conrail management had been condoning the procedures through acquiescence. Further, the disconnecting of the flashing "O" train order signal, the nailing shut of the window which prevented the display of the train order signal at the OW tower, and the existence of this situation for at least 4 years seems to confirm that Conrail management had been condoning improper train order procedures. The situation Was worsened by the fact that an improperly trained operator, who had acquired the bad habit of replying BDA (blocking device applied) before actually doing so, had been working for more than a year without being checked in the performance of his duties by a supervisor.

Radio Communications

Since the engineer of OPSE-7 received his train order on channel 2 and train No. 74 was onchannel 3, the engineer of train No. 74 was not alerted by radio traffic on channel 2 that OPSE-7 was operating on track No. 2 from the opposite direction. N o. 74 was monitoring channel 3 in compliance with the timetable special instructions and OPSE-7 was not monitoring channel 3 because the Conrail freight locomotive units are not equipped with a radio with channel 3. However, the Conrail timetable had established limits of operation that required the use of channel 3 in the area of the accident. If both trains had been operating on the same radio channel, the engineer of train No. 74 may have heard the train order given to the engineer of OPSE-7 to use track No. 2 and thus have been alerted that an opposing move was being made, and have stopped his train on track No. 2 at 0W. If train No. 74 had stopped at OW, this accident would have been prevented. However, Conrail management instead of having their freight train locomotives equipped with radios to receive and transmit on channel 3 so that the engineers could comply with the timetable instructions, equipped the towers with a radio with channel 2. The operators then monitored channel 2 and 3 simultaneously and when necessary could transmit train orders to freight trains on channel 2.

The conflict between the Conrail timetable instructions and the Conrail precedures for operation of train radio on different channels between M0 Tower, Bronx, New York, and CD Tower, Harmon, New York, which includes the area of the accident, is a failure to comply with 49 CFR Part 220.39 requiring radios to operate on the designated channel. The engineer of OPSE-7 could not turn to channel No. 3, as specified by the timetable and required by 49 CFR Part 220.23, because his locomotive was not equipped with a radio to operate on channel 3. This is another example of the failure of management and supervision to ensure that operations were conducted in accordance with Conrail rules and Federal requirements for safe train operations.