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- 4 - platform, the motorman said that the cab signal changed directly from a "yellow 35" to a flashing red aspect and that he did not hear an audible overspeed alarm. He continued moving into the station and stopped the train at the eight-car mark.

When the conductor signalled him to proceed, the motorman applied minimum power and moved out of the station with the cab signal displaying a flashing red aspect; he did not receive authorization to proceed from CTA central control. He stated later that he believed that he was not required to obtain permission to move on the flashing red cab signal because there were other locations on the CTA system where a train could be operated on a flashing red cab signal without first having to obtain permission. He also cited a CTA training brochure on "Cab Control Signalling" which does not state that operators must obtain permission to move on a flashing red cab signal as giving him authority to move. (See appendix A.) According to his testimony, he believed that a flashing red cab signal aspect was the best proceed signal that he could obtain because he said that it was the only Signal he had ever received at Wabash Avenue and Lake Street. He also stated that he did not know of a "yellow 15" cab signal aspect, but that he was familiar with a "yellow 25" aspect. A "yellow 25" cab signal aspect is not used on the West-South Line.

When the Lake-Dan Ryan train entered the offset curve (see figure 2) to the right at a Speed of about 10 mph, the motorman moved the cineston to the coast position. This is a normal operating procedure. He was standing at the car controls, as CTA operating rules required. When the train entered the curve to the left, the motorman saw the rear car of the standing Ravenswood train. He claimed that this was his first view of the train since before he entered the Randolph street Station. He also said that his view from within the operating compartment was obstructed by the windshield wiper motor, the door at his left, and the trainphone equipment. He further stated that he could not have seen the rear of the Ravenswood train from his location in the cab before he entered the curve, because the train was hidden from his view by a building in the southwest corner of the intersection. (See figure 2.) When he sighted the train, he testified that he immediately applied the maximum service brakes; he claimed they were not effective, however. He then applied the emergency brakes. He said he heard the magnetic track brakes drop but that the train still did not seem to slow, and it struck the Ravenswood train at 7 to 9.5 mph. (See appendix B.)