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- 16 - From some point between Tower 12 and Randolph Street Station, he saw the lead cars of the Ravenswood train as it began to round the curve at Wabash and Lake. He testified that he knew that the train would be diverted at Tower 18 and that it would no longer be a concern for him. However, he failed to observe that the train stopped before clearing the curve. The train was standing where it was visible from the Randolph Street Station, even though he testified that, "When I stopped at Randolph, I did not see the train prior to my stopping at Randolph and Wabash. I thought he was in State and Lake because I felt assured that he had already cleared the curve because I did not see him in the curve." The test train run reenacting the events leading up to the accident could only lead the participants to the conclusion that the motorman of the Lake-Dan Ryan train should have seen the Ravenswood train. Since he did not see the train until just before the Collision, he obviously was not fully alert to the conditions ahead. He stated that it was his belief that the train ahead was gone. This belief may have been strengthened by his receiving proper cab signal aspects for a clear track condition on his entry into Randolph Street Station.

He also believed that the flashing red cab signal aspect, which according to his testimony was displayed beginning with the train's arrival at the four-car mark at Randolph Street Station, was correct.

It is possible that the steady red cab signal indication could have been missed by the motorman because of its short display time and because his attention was directed at bringing the train into the station. Thus, when he saw the train standing in the curve in front of him, it was in total disbelief and he was taken entirely by surprise. This element of surpriSe could have affected his judgment and response.

An eyewitness on the Lake-Dan Ryan train established that the rear car of the standing Ravenswood train was visible before and at the time the Lake-Dan Ryan train moved from the Randolph Street Station. Once more it is clear that if the motorman had been observing the track ahead he should have seen the train. If he had known his cab signal indications, he would have known that the track was not clear.

The stopping tests made with a train consist similar to that of the Lake-Dan Ryan train indicates that even if the motorman had not sighted the standing train until after he left the Randolph Street Station and had accelerated up to 15 mph, his train could have been stopped short of the collision point.

The motorman of the Lake-Dan Ryan train said that he had seen CTA bulletin S-511-76, but that he did not relate its application to the circumstances involving his train on the day of the accident. He explained this by saying that at other locations on the CTA system a train could be operated on a flashing red cab signal without first receiving permission from the controller to proceed. This could have generated confusion, especially if one's knowledge of the rules was