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- 33 - 16. Although in the 1970 written examinations, the crewmembers interpreted Rule 515 to require that a crewmember be sent far enough in advance of the movement to provide flag protection, evidence indicated confusion on the part of some employees regarding the relationship between Rule 515 and Rules 99, 99(a), and D-99 as well. It was not clear whether Rule 515 referred to Rule 99 only or to 99(a) and D-99 as well.

17. Rules 7, 35, 896, and 1003, which require that proper flagging equipment be carried on trains, were not consistently enforced by management. This implied that flagging was not important in suburban service.

18. The absence of a crewmember with the title "flagman" was not pertinent to the accident.

19. The ICG did not comply with Illinois Commerce Commission General Order No. 196. It could not be determined whether this contributed to the accident.

20. The design of the cars, which located the conductor's controls in the center vestibule of the Highliner car, was incompatible with the operating requirements that he govern the reverse movement and see that the track was clear.

21. The walkway at 27th Street obstructed an approaching train's view of Signal 3-3.10 and diminished the effect of that signal.

22. The automatic—block signal system did not adequately transmit sufficient information to identify fully the hazard to the engineer of train 720.

23. The designs of the anti—climbing arrangements of the two trains prevented overriding between cars within the trains but did not prevent overriding between the two dissimilar cars which collided.

24. Federal regulations did not require a design which would prevent overriding of colliding trains.

25. The unsecured trucks of the first car of train 720 permitted the car to override the underframe of the Highliner car, which resulted in more penetration than would have occurred if the trucks had been secured.

26. The Interstate Commerce Commission allowed the trucks of the "old" cars to remain unsecured in an order dated September 22, 1954.

27. The collision posts of the Highliner car, even if constructed according to design, were not adequate to withstand the forces in the collision.