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- 31 - In its Darien, Connecticut, report, the Safety Board repeated an earlier recommendation that the Federal Railroad Administration

"...initiate studies to determine the relationship between rail passenger car design and passenger injury and, where practical, take action for correction in the design of future high-speed and rapid transit passenger cars."

Because of budget limitations, crashworthiness was not one of the areas of safety research performed by the FRA.

Safety Board observation of two Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) cars which collided revealed a design concept which should be investigated. The underframe and coupler of the BART cars are designed to absorb impact energy between cars without resulting in serious damage to passenger compartments.

Without comprehensive crash testing, the impact forces which can be withstood by an MU car which meet Federal requirements cannot be determined. However, considering calculated collision forces, the Safety Board believes that collision posts designed to withstand specified shear forces without any consideration given to the bending and torsion which collisions impose on the posts are inadequate.

A well conceived research and development project could develop all requirements. Collision posts may or may not be a necessary structural member in a properly designed, crashworthy commuter car.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. The overrun of the 27th Street station platform by train 416 was caused by the failure of the engineer to initiate a brake application soon enough to stop the train at the platform from the speed at which the train was running.

2. Train 416 passed beyond the limits of the block of Signal 3-3.60 and stopped 400 feet beyond Signal 3-3.10.

3. Neither the engineer nor the conductor established whether train 416 had passed completely beyond the block of Signal 3-3.60 before they began to back up the train.

4. The conductor of train 416 failed to provide the flag protection prescribed by Rule 515.