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- 27 - The railroad must stand as final authority in rule interpretation when the interpretation is given before an accident occurs. The different interpretations of these rules after the accident and misconceptions in rule examinations suggest the need for one authoritative interpretation for each situation, issued when a rule is initially written and then used for training and enforcement. Such an official interpretation, of course, is not as useful as a clearly written rule understandable in all situations without interpretation. An interpretation given only after an accident can be considered authoritative for later operations but is not authoritative at the time of the accident.

Management Practices

On September 8, 1970, an Illinois Central (IC) train collided with an Indiana Harbor Belt train on IC track at Riverdale, Ill. The accident occurred as the IC train was backing under the authority of a restricted proceed signal in automatic—block signal territory. Rules 99, D-99, 106, 106[a), and 291 were involved in the collision, and the Safety Board determined that inadequacies in operating rules, practices, and personnel training Contributed. That these same factors contributed to the accident at 27th Street suggests that the railroad managment had not eliminated the inadequacies in the intervening 2 years.

Employees who are advanced to positions of responsibility have the right to believe that their performances meet company standards. Train and engine crewmembers working on the Chicago Division failed to comply with Rules 7, 35, 896, and 1003 with full knowledge of their supervisors. This failure by management to discipline or reprimand employees for not carrying flagging equipment led to the degradation of the rules. Management's laxity in failing to provide flagging equipment on suburban trains further indicated to employees that the importance of flagging had diminished.

Station overruns and short backing movements had been accepted in the past by railroad management. This acceptance by ICC supervisors of questionable operating practices and the degradation of flagging rules may have contributed to the failure of the crew of train 416 to protect their train by flagging as it backed at the 27th Street station. Furthermore, the lack of rule understanding and enforcement disclosed during the Board's investigation is not consistent with the 99.54-percent efficiency in rule compliance claimed by ICC for Chicago Division employees.