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- 25 - The large difference between the 30-m.p.h. speed required by the operating rules and the 50 to 55-m.p.h. speed indicated by the evidence suggests that the presence of a speedometer on 720 perhaps would have reduced the overspeed but probably would not have prevented the collision. However, if the rear of train 416 or the red aspect of Signal 3-3.10 had been visible to the engineer as he passed Signal 3-3.60, the possibility of his taking effective preventive action would have been increased. Passengers on 718 stated that he appeared to be alert and looking ahead at that time.

Operation of Train 416

The only known equipment deficiency which could have contributed to the overrun of the station platform was the speedometer on 416, which registered a maximum of 63 m.p.h. If the train was going faster than 63 m.p.h., and the engineer applied the brakes at the normal spot for a station stop from 63 m.p.h., the train probably would have overrun the platform. Even a 10-m.p.h. overspeed, however would not have resulted in an overrun of the entire train of the distance that 416 experienced.

Since October 30 was the first day the engineer was assigned to train 416 and since 27th Street was a flag stop, it is probable that the engineer forgot about the conductor's instructions to stop until it was too late to prevent a station overrun.

Once the overrun occurred, Rules 106 and 886 made the conductor responsible for assuring that the reverse movement was accomplished safely. Furthermore, since the train stopped north of Signal 3-3.10, Rule 515 required that the reverse movement be protected by flagging. The conductor failed to comply with these rules.

The engineer should have known that the rear of his train had passed beyond the limits of the block of 3-3.10 and that flag protection would be required to return to the platform. He also should have known the conductor was in a center vestibule from the conductor's use of the intercom. The engineer did not question whether the train had passed beyond Signal 3-3.10 or whether a flagman had been sent out. At no time did he sound the whistle for a flagman. Therefore, the engineer did not take the precautions prescribed by Rules 106 and 1022.

Although Rule 106(a) required that the collector "must take immediate action to stop the train," it is doubtful whether the collector knew that an emergency existed. His location inside cars at the center of the train provided no direct view of the signals.