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 Therefore, the Safety Board commends the town of Salem and all those persons who assisted after the accident for their exemplary response to the emergency created by this accident.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. Locomotive unit 4031 was operated from New Orleans to Chicago on June 7, 1971, with the No. 2 motor shut down and the power reverser of that circuit blocked in neutral position. The motor was tagged in compliance with 49 CFR 230.262.

2. Information on the daily Locomotive Inspection Report for June 7, 1971, indicated that the power reverser for the No. 2 circuit of unit 4031 was blocked.

3. ICRR repairmen repaired unit 4031 prior to use on June 10, 1971, and indicated on the Locomotive Inspection Report that the repairs had been completed; however, the power reverse: for the No. 2 circuit was left blocked in the neutral position.

4. Tests made of the repairs on unit 4031 did not detect the blocked reverser.

5. The carrier’s required tests of a locomotive prior to dispatch from an initial terminal did not detect the cutout circuit on unit 4031.

6. Unit 4031 was dispatched on train No. 1 from Chicago on June 10, 1971, with the No. 2 circuit power reverser blocked in neutral position which eliminated the means of indicating sliding of the driving wheels of the rear truck.

7. Use of unit 4031 on train No. 1 from Chicago on June 10, 1971, with no means to indicate the sliding of the driving wheels on the rear truck violated 49 CFR 230.201(d).

8. The engineers had no means of testing the operability of warning devices on the locomotive.

9. The first engine crew of train No. 1 detected the condition of the No; 2 circuit of unit 4031 and informed the second crew at Champaign.

10. The load meter in the locomotive control compartment only indicated the amount of current being supplied to one motor circuit

11. The engineer and fireman with their knowledge and with the appliances furnished to them could not have been expected to determine whether power was supplied to all traction metors.

12. The train was operated in accordance with the rules of the carrier between Champaign and the point of the accident.

13. The leading pair of wheels of the rear truck of unit 4031 probably became locked when the train made its scheduled stop at Effingham and slid continuously from Effingham to the point of the accident, a distance of 39.8 miles.

14. Loosening of a locking plate in a traction motor armature hearing permitted exces- sive lateral movement of the armature.

15. The excessive lateral movement of the armature caused overheating of the bearings, deterioration of the lubrication, and eventual failure.

16. The reconditioning of the armature did not contribute to the failure of the hearings in this accident.

17. Title 49 CFR 230.262, which allows a unit to continue in service after a defective motor is cut out, nullifies the wheel-slip indicator. This is in conflict with Section 230.201(d), which requires indication of slipping or sliding driving wheels, and the regulation does not provide an adequate level of safety in the operation of locomotives in mainline service.

18. Neither Federal Regulations nor Recom- mended Standards of the AAR provide for the maintenance and operation of traction motors and-other major component parts of locomotives.

19. As a result of the derailment, passenger cars were jackknifed and turned over on their sides by the high compressive forces 34