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 of these engines was stored in five compressed-gas tanks carried in a rack mounted under the car floor

3. Operation of the Train Between Chicago and the Point of Accident

Shortly after the train departed from Chicago, the engine crew discovered that the locomotive was lacking power. The fireman checked the units and found that two engines in the center units and the No 2 engine in unit 4031 were not loading. He made several adjust- ments on the engines and was then able to operate the two engines of the middle units but not the No 2 engine on 4031. No additional trouble was experienced en route to Champaign, where the train arrived at 10:44 am., 34 minutes late

Engine crews were changed at Champaign, The new crew was informed of the problems encountered between Chicago and Champaign, including the unsuccessful attempt to get No, 2 engine in unit 4031 to operate properly While the new fireman was checking the No 2 engine, the train departed from Champaign at 10:53 a .m., 33 minutes late When he heard the No 2 engine increase its speed in response to the engineer’s operating the throttle and after he checked the governor and load regulator, the fireman concluded that the engine was oper- ating. He then informed the engineer that all engines were operating

The train made scheduled stops at Mattoon and Effingham No inspections of the train Were made during these stops. There were 211 pas- sengers on the train when it departed from Effingham at 11:53 am. Train No. 1 passed Edgewood, the last open office, 24.4 miles north of the accident point, at 12:05 p in. The station operator made an inspection of the east side of the train from his position on the platform He observed no defects and signaled to the train crew accordingly. When train No 1 passed a northbound freight train in the vicinity of Edgewood, the crew of the freight signaled to No I that they had observed no defects The crew of train No 1 had looked over the train a number of times and had not observed any defects. The engineer stated that he had suf- ficient power to operate the train and that at no time was the wheel—slip light indicator lit or were any other warning signals received that would have indicated an abnormal operation of the locomotive

4. Derailment of the Train

The train was moving at a speed of about 90 miles per hour on the southward main track as it approached the crossover between the main tracks at Tonti. The engineer was reducing speed in anticipation of a reduce-speed aspect at the next signal. The engine crew stated that the locomotive rode smoothly and that there was no indication of any defect. The engineer felt a bump as the locomotive moved over the south switch of the crossover and he then saw the locomotive derail. He immediately applied the brakes in emergency and braced himself as the first unit turned over on its right side. As the unit slid southward on its side about 390 feet, ballast and dirt were scooped into the cab partially Covering the engineer. After the unit stopped, the fireman assisted the engineer and together they crawled through a window on the left side of the control compartment. After the crew got out, they observed that the second unit was on fire; and soon thereafter, the first unit caught fire.

As the train approached Tonti, the baggage man and the conductor were seated on opposite sides of the conductor's desk, which was located between two of the seats along the right side in the rear of the third car. The conductor was facing forward. The baggageman first noticed the impending derailment when the rear of the third car raised upwards and the car turned over on its right side. The conductor was hurled through a window as the car rolled over. The baggageman was thrown around the inside of the car, and, although he was injured, he was able to crawl out of the car after it came to a stop 10