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 The following safety devices and warning systems are provided as part of the locomotive controls:

a. Safety Control (Dead-man) - provided a penalty application of the brakes in case the engineer becomes incapacitated.

b. Pneumatic Control Switch (PC) - auto- matically reduced power in response to a penalty application of the air brakes.

c. Ground Relay - detected an electrical ground in the primary circuit.

d Lube Oil Pressure Alarm - detected low oil or incorrect pressure in an engine

3 No Power Alarm - was actuated when an engine is automatically shut down.

f. Hot Engine Alarm - warned of excessive engine heat.

Additional controls for the operation of each diesel engine were mounted on a panel near the front of each engine in the engine room. An isolation switch with two positions, "Start" and "Run", had to be placed in the "Run" position for the diesel engine to function. When the switch was placed in the "Start" position, the diesel engine was disconnected from the control circuit and was reduced to idle. Engine "Start" and "Stop" buttons as well as other switches and indicators were located on the panel. (See Figure 4 )

3. Steam-Heat Generator

Each of the locomotive units involved in the accident was provided with an oil-fired steam generator which provided steam for use in the dining cars and for heating water in all cars. During periods of cold weather, the steam was also used for heating. The steam generator was located at the rear of each locomotive unit.

4. Wheel-Slip Protection Device

Locomotive units had been provided with a protective electrical circuit which warned the engineer when any pair of driving wheels of the locomotive slipped or slid. In unit 4031, this had been accomplished by the detection of a dif- ferential of current produced between the two traction motors in the circuit when either pair of driving wheels slipped or slid. The actuation of this circuit would have lit a wheel-slip indicator on the panel in front of the engineer which would have stayed lit until the current dif- ferential was corrected. There was no other alarm in this circuit.

If no current had been supplied to the traction motors, the wheel-slip protection device could not have functioned.

D. Operation of Locomotive Unit 4031 Prior to the Accident

On June 6, 1971, unit 4031 was dispatched as the lead unit of a three-unit locomotive consist in Amtrak’s train No. 1 from Chicago, Illinois, to New Orleans, Louisiana Shortly after depart- ing from Chicago, the No. 2 engine on the unit failed to supply electrical power, and it was isolated for the remainder of the trip by positioning the isolation switch at the "Start" position. Inspection of the unit in New Orleans revealed that the auxiliary generator in the No. 2 circuit was defective. It was decided to return the unit to Chicago with the No. 2 engine shut down so that repairs could be made by the ICRR at their Woodcrest shop, near Chicago.

The No. 2 engine was shut down in New Orleans and a yellow tag bearing the notation "Do Not Start" was attached to the isolation switch on the No. 2 engine control panel. This tag also carried a brief description of the defective condition. As an additional precaution, the power reverser for the No. 2 power circuit was placed in neutral position and a 3/8-inch diameter pin inserted to lock the reverser in this position for the movement to Chicago. The ICRR does not require that the power reverser be locked in neutral position when a diesel engine is shut down.

Unit 4031, with the conditions so described, was dispatched from New Orleans to Chicago as the middle unit of a three—unit consist. The engineers who prepared locomotive inspection reports at Canton and McComb, Missisippi, and 8