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With the reestablishment of high-speed, high-density rail passenger service over tracks formerly used by freight train traffic alone, the pepulation at risk at grade crossings has increased to the point that the consequences of train-motor vehicle collisions could be as serious as those of a major air disaster. If the dump truck had crashed head-on into the side of the passenger car or if it had been a vehicle carrying a hazardous material cargo, this collision could have been a catastrophe of major scale.

The above safety problem was recognized by the Safety Board in a 1971 special study. The Board concluded in'the study that "grade crossings are not compatible with rail rapid transit operations" and recommended that the FRA consider these incompatibilities when it establishes methods to protect grade crossings. The FRA responded to this recommendation in the Department of Transportation's 1972 report to Congress on railroad-highway safety. In the report, the DOT cited short term and long term projects which employed various methods to protect grade crossings, and also suggested that States begin a comprehensive field review of each of the high-speed rail corridors. The field review of the Chicago-to-St. Louis corridor was initiated by the IDOT after this accident occurred. 0f the various projects cited by the DOT in its report, only one—The National Crossing Inventory and Numbering Project—had been initiated or implemented on the Chicago-to-St. Louis corridor before this accident.

Although turboliner trains have been taken out of service on the Chicago-to-St. Louis corridor, high-speed passenger rail service will continue. The need for action to improve grade crossing safety is, therefore, still present.

The forces generated during the crash dynamics caused the buffers which connected the end of the second car to the front of the third car to misalign and to bypass. Once the buffers were separated, the tension on the link coupler relaxed and the link was able to bounce off the hook. This permitted the cars to separate and contributed to the derailment of the third, fourth, and fifth cars.