Page:NTSB-MAR-81-8 MV Testbank and MV Seadaniel accident report.pdf/8

 previously ordered course because of a tendency of the SEADANIEL to steer to the right. The third mate testified that he had observed the helmsman having difficulty maintaining course and observed the heading fall off to the right. The third mate said nothing because the pilot discovered the error within a few seconds.

About 2042, the pilot of the SEADANIEL contacted the pilot of the TESTBANK on VHF radio channel 67 and according to the VTS tape recording of the conversation told him "Doug, these guys are going to run this&hellip;ship aground. They're hard-headed, they don't listen&hellip;"

The pilot of the SEADANIEL felt that the vessel's swing to port, to return to the ordered course, was too rapid and he ordered the rudder put hard to starboard to check the vessel's swing. The master and third mate of the SEADANIEL heard the order. The pilot stated that the reason for the order was due to the proximity of the approaching TESTBANK to his left. The master testified that when the pilot ordered hard to starboard the TESTBANK was directly ahead of the SEADANIEL, but that he did not know whether the TESTBANK was steady on course or maneuvering because he was not paying attention to the movement of the TESTBANK. The helmsman testified that the pilot "&hellip;start hollering and I could not understand what he was saying&hellip;" The pilot appeared "agitated" to the crew and went beyond normal rudder and engine commands in his instructions in English to the crew to pay attention to the vessel's navigation. The third mate did not see the helmsman change his rudder but did hear him "swear a little bit." The pilot observed that despite his order and instructions the SEADANIEL's rate of turn to the left had accelerated. He looked at the illuminated rudder angle indicator and saw the pointer at the hard-to-port position. The master could not see either the position of the ship's rudder order indicator or the rudder angle indicator from his position on the forward left side of the bridge. The helmsman denied having the wheel hard to port. The third mate, who was standing behind the helmsman, stated that he saw the helm about 10º left when the pilot spoke loudly to the helmsman. The third mate said that he did not "observe any swing of the vessel" other than a very slow swing of the bow to port returning from the 294º excursion.

The pilot of the SEADANIEL ordered the danger signal sounded, repeated his order to put the rudder hard to starboard, and turned and motioned to the helmsman pointing to starboard. The third mate saw the helmsman apply right rudder after the second order. The third mate felt that both the orders were clearly given and he hard the helmsman repeat back the second order. The third mate stated there were less than 60 seconds between the two hard-to-starboard orders. The pilot stated that due to the closeness of the TESTBANK, estimated to be about 500 feet away, he believed that the two vessels would collide since there was insufficient time to correct the accelerated port swing. He therefore ordered the engine stopped at 2043 and moments later ordered the engine full speed astern. The pilot said he ordered "double full astern" just prior to the collision; that order is not logged in the engine room bell book, but the master heard the order.

The pilot of the SEADANIEL testified that he advised the TESTBANK's pilot by VHF radio channel 67 that the SEADANIEL was backing full. The VTS tape has portions of this conversation recorded at 2043, indicating that the pilot did transmit words to the effect that "Doug, they put the wheel hard a-port." The remainder of the communication was unintelligible.

The SEADANIEL's pilot testified that he had communicated with the vessel's master in English without difficulty, but he had not conversed with any of the crew except to give rudder and engine orders. The pilot testified that language differences are sometimes a problem and stated that he depended on his visual observations to verify that his orders