Page:NTSB-MAR-81-8 MV Testbank and MV Seadaniel accident report.pdf/23

 containers that were located three positions inboard on the TESTBANK were not damaged. Alternately, the restriction of traffic to one-way operation during periods of dangerous cargo transit should be considered as a preventive measure.

CONCLUSIONS

Findings


 * 1) The TESTBANK was prudently navigated downbound in the MRGO by the pilot.
 * 2) The pilots of both the TESTBANK and the SEADANIEL utilized bridge-to-bridge communications effectively.
 * 3) The master of the SEADANIEL was aware of the only other major vessel in the channel approaching his vessel but could not say what that vessel's specific movements were because he "was not paying attention."
 * 4) The SEADANIEL's pilot might have avoided this accident by listening for a repeat back of all rudder commands by the helmsman or by more closely observing the helmsman's response to each rudder command.
 * 5) The SEADANIEL's pilot contributed to the confusion of the helmsman by raising his voice and lecturing to him in English about the need for maintaining course.
 * 6) The helmsman failed to understand the pilot's first order of hard to starboard.
 * 7) The master of the SEADANIEL, who understood the pilot's first order of hard to starboard and who generally required that all rudder commands be repeated back, did not enforce this practice when the helmsman did not repeat back the order of hard to starboard. The master should have immediately advised the pilot that the helmsman had not repeated back the hard to starboard order.
 * 8) The third mate of the SEADANIEL, who was aware that the helmsman was confused and did not properly respond to the pilot's order, did nothing. The third mate should have immediately advised the pilot that the helmsman did had not properly responded to the hard to starboard order.
 * 9) The SEADANIEL came left across the channel centerline and collided with the TESTBANK.
 * 10) The SEADANIEL's left turn was due to the improper application of left rudder by the helmsman when right rudder was ordered.
 * 11) Had the dangerous cargo containers on the TESTBANK been stowed at least three containers inboard from the side of the vessel, the major environmental pollution incident that resulted from this accident would not have occurred.
 * 12) An analysis of the traffic on the MRGO would be beneficial in determining whether one-way traffic during periods of dangerous cargo transit is warranted, in all or a portion of the channel.