Page:NTSB-MAR-81-8 MV Testbank and MV Seadaniel accident report.pdf/19

 Operation of SEADANIEL

The pilot of the SEADANIEL navigated the vessel upbound in the MRGO, after relieving the Associated Branch pilot. The pilot did not discuss the vessel's characteristics with the master, but relied instead on a discussion with the Associated Branch pilot for details. WHile he did not check on the foreign crew's English language capability initially or when the watch changed, he observed their actions in response to his orders, found them satisfactory, and experienced no translation difficulties prior to the accident. In addition, he had a discussion with the vessel's master in English concerning the vessel's speed and did not experience any language difficulty.

While the helmsman had been following the master's instructions to repeat back all helm orders, the pilot was unable to state that he either listened for or heard a helm order repeated back. The pilot's system of ascertaining that his orders were correctly followed was by his own visual observation. In a close quarters situation, such as the meeting of the SEADANIEL and the TESTBANK in the MRGO, time is critical. Critical time may be lost if visual observation is directed exclusively to the usually observed parameters of vessel motion such as bow swing, compass heading, or even the rudder angle indicator. This lost time is due to the combination of the reaction times of man and the ship. In this particular instance, the pilot's monitoring should have been directed regularly to the direction the helmsman moved the wheel. The pilot, therefore, would be aware that an order to the helmsman was understood and would be carried out in the proper direction.

When the vessel was on the Shell Beach reach of the MRGO, the pilot visually saw the TESTBANK before its turn into the reach about 5 1/2 to 7 miles away. The pilot properly used his radio to call the TESTBANK pilot on the bridge-to-bridge radio and agreed to a "one-whistle" meeting. The SEADANIEL made the turn to the left to enter into the reach routinely and the pilot anticipated a routine meeting with the TESTBANK.

About 2042 when the pilot of the SEADANIEL noticed the vessel's head swing slightly to the right, he ordered the vessel returned to the left to course 290º. When the pilot attempted to correct the vessel's course excursion to the right, he appeared "upset" to the ship's crew. In his orders to the crew, the pilot raised his voice and tried to explain to or "instruct" the bridge crew that it was necessary to follow his orders strictly because of the closeness of the left descending bank to his starboard and the closeness of the approaching TESTBANK ahead and slightly to the SEADANIEL's port side. He attempted to convey this urgency to the crew, but because of the language differences his actions confused and upset the helmsman.

The ship's third mate, who was operating the engine order telegraph, could see and hear the response of the helmsman, but when he observed the vessel off course said nothing to the pilot or master because within a few seconds the pilot was aware of the error and was attempting to correct the vessel's heading.

The pilot of the SEADANIEL felt that the vessel's swing to port to return to the ordered course was too rapid. In an attempt to check the vessel's swing to the left, the pilot had ordered hard to starboard on two occasions. The vessel's master and third mate heard both ordered clearly. The third mate stated that the helmsman initially did nothing but "swear a little bit" in response to the order and instructions did not change the position of the helm. The helmsman testified he did not properly respond to the pilot's order, the third mate said and did nothing. The master, who heard the orders and was in a position to be aware that the helmsman did not repeat back the pilot's initial order, and therefore, may not have understood it, did nothing. From his position on the port side forward of the bridge, the vessel's master could see neither the gyrocompass repeater nor the rudder angle indicator. He could, therefore, not ascertain with certainty