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2 As the Court’s opinion here explains, Pike’s balancing and tailoring principles are most frequently deployed to detect the presence or absence of latent economic protectionism. See. That is no surprise. Warding off state discrimination against interstate commerce is at the heart of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, ,.

As the Court’s opinion also acknowledges, however, the Court has “generally le[ft] the courtroom door open” to claims premised on “even nondiscriminatory burdens.” Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U. S. 328, 353 (2008); see. Indeed, “a small number” of this Court’s cases in the Pike line “have invalidated state laws … that appear to have been genuinely nondiscriminatory” in nature. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U. S. 278, 298, n. 12 (1997); see ante, at 17. Often, such cases have addressed state laws that impose burdens on the arteries of commerce, on “trucks, trains, and the like.” Ibid., n. 2. Yet, there is at least one exception to that tradition. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 643–646 (1982) (invalidating a nondiscriminatory state law that regulated tender offers to shareholders).

Pike claims that do not allege discrimination or a burden on an artery of commerce are further from Pike’s core. As recognizes, however, the Court today does not shut the door on all such Pike claims. See ante, at 17–18, and ;. Thus, petitioners’ failure to allege discrimination or an impact on the instrumentalities of commerce does not doom their Pike claim.

Nor does a majority of the Court endorse the view that judges are not up to the task that Pike prescribes. , for a plurality, concludes that petitioners’ Pike claim fails because courts are incapable of balancing economic burdens against noneconomic benefits. See. I do not join that portion of ’s