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 reformers no longer set the tone. This trend was reinforced by the move to restore civilian government in 1963. Senior officers, donning mufti, managed to get the lion's share of important posts, largely due to their more extensive administrative experience. The zealous young colonels who had occupied the top posts in the SCNR lost out in the shuffle and this resulted in a general change of tone under the present "Third Republic."

This did not mean, however, that political reform was dead, but only that Pak was working with somewhat different means in the same general direction. The military leaders generally had been highly reluctant to honor their original pledge to restore a constitutional form of government, and did so only in response to a variety of pressures. U.S. prodding was perhaps the most important inasmuch as they were well aware of their dependence upon U.S. goodwill. A significant factor, too, was that there was still strong attachment to the principle of democracy despite the weakness of political parties. At least equally important, however, was division and mutual suspicion among the military leaders. Their infighting, combined with cases of ineptitude, left some room for democratic opinion to put pressure on Pak to restore civil government.

The dropping of the more radical junior officers from administrative posts of importance and the concession to civilian participation under a constitutional framework did not prevent the gradual growth after 1963 of the role of former military men in Pak's government. Even more significant, however, has been the growth of executive power concentrated increasingly in Pak's own hands. Particularly since 1868-69, when Pak pushed through a constitutional amendment enabling him to run for a third term, he has steadily increased his powers, most spectacularly since October 1972. Under the October reforms, the way is paved for Pak's lifetime presidency even more clearly than it was for Rhee in the mid-1950's.

This situation merely postpones the succession problem. The only constitutional succession that Korea has experienced was hardly a normal transition. President Rhee's forced resignation in April 1960 was followed by drastic revision of the constitution in June and elections in August. The election victor, Chang Myon, became Prime Minister, but he was ignominiously turned out of office less than 9 months later by the military. Rhee had persistently eliminated any potentially strong successor as a threat to his power, and Pak appears to be pursuing his example here, too. He has played off the military factions against each other, and by occasional rustication abroad has kept his nephew-in-law, Kim Chong-p'il, first head of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency and now Prime Minister, from becoming too powerful. The chief architect of the group, Kim had quietly organized a sort of Trojan-horse Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which won Pak his first term, having had a head start when parties were permitted to reappear in 1963.

Suspicious of politics, Pak has kept all political parties, including the government's own DRP, from becoming strong forces which might support a challenge to his position. The DRP has helped to preserve the facade of democratic government, but its job has been purely electoral. Pak now calls for parties "on the American pattern—active only on the eve of an election," as he has put it. In fact, their role has been rigidly curtailed under the 1972-73 reforms. The DRP is confined largely to propaganda-peddling and training youthful supporters.

Pak's curbing of the DRP is in keeping with his careful control over all his former comrades-in-arms occupying positions of power. The military constitute the only force which could conceivably mount a successful threat to his authority under present conditions, and many ex-officers are well entrenched in office. Some of them have also built up private fortunes through bribery and corruption, thus flouting Pak's strictures. Officers on active duty are still prone to Korea's endemic factionalism. In early 1973 Pak cracked down by arresting one of his oldest associates, the commander of the Capital Security Command, who had been building up his own personal following and had broached the idea of expanding the military's role in running the nation by having it supplant the existing civilian political organizations. In Pak's reaction 18