Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 19 HUNGARY COUNTRY PROFILE CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3.pdf/19

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3

The Regime and the People (S)

The seeds of liberalism planted by Janos Kadar have yet to yield a crop of popular allegiance. About the best that can be said in behalf of the regime is that the populace appears to be progressively less antagonistic toward it. Outright support, however, remains negligible. Rather, the citizenry by and large seems ideologically neutral and politically passive. Pessimism to the point of fatalism is characteristic of Hungarians. They have learned to accept what comes and to avoid that which will bring only pain. The failure of the 1956 revolt led to the final realization that Hungary was enmeshed in the East-West power balance and that as a result the Magyars, once again, could not choose their own path of development. Still, they have resisted the regime's efforts to build a collectivist mentality and impose a Marxist-Leninist belief system. If anything, individualistic behavior has become more pronounced. Minor protests are mounted on occasion, but they are usually squelched by a government inclined to be more lenient than its predecessors. Moreover, active dissidence is isolated in character, usually emanating from small bands of romantic idealists at home and professional anti-regime refugees abroad. Neither element poses much real danger to a system powerful in itself, assured of Soviet backing, and relieved of the threat of Western intervention.

Reasonably secure in the present and relatively confident of the future, the regime has sought reconciliation with its largely submissive citizenry. It has posted notice that fealty to the party is no longer required for a citizen to leave in peace. Variant life styles are tolerated if they do not represent open conflict with the principles of the

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3