Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/9

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

Czechoslovakia's serving as a "bridge between East and West." They lulled the nation into a false sense of security and tolerated the activities of domestic Communists and Soviet agents who were already preparing for an eventual takeover.

The Czechoslovak experiment with the popular-front government formed in 1946 was viewed with considerable optimism by some Western leaders, who were prepared to believe that the Communists were sincere in their professed desire to cooperate with the democratic parties in a multiparty government. The subsequent Communist coup came as a harsh awakening to the West and dashed hopes for constructive cooperation with Communists in the international political arena.

The Czechoslovak Communists had carefully prepared the groundwork for their seizure of power. In particular, they were able legally to place party members in key government positions. Other postwar developments also had contributed to setting the stage for this event. The Soviet occupation authorities not only actively supported the Communists in efforts to extend their political influence and organization but also sought to obstruct in numerous ways the rebuilding of the non-Communist political organizations shattered by the war. Thus, Soviet influence, the pliant attitudes of Czechoslovakia's first postwar government, the party's legal status during the interwar period, and its role in the anti-Nazi underground all contributed to Communist strength. In the last free national elections held in May 1946, the Communists gained 38% of the vote. By 1948 the party's popularity had diminished considerably, but by then it was well entrenched in the government, the trade unions, and other public organizations. Moreover, many non-Communist political leaders naively supposed they could combat the Communist threat by democratic means. In February 1948, 12 non-Communist cabinet ministers attempted to hasten new national elections by resigning from the cabinet in protest against Communist manipulation of the police. The Communists, however, seized the initiative by activating "action committees" which effectively took over every governmental office, nationalized enterprise, and public organization. President Benes, who vacillated in the governmental crisis, accepted the government's resignation and a new, virtually all-Communist cabinet was formed.

After 1948, organized opposition to the Czechoslovak Communist Party—from either the non-Communist political parties or underground activity—was eliminated. The party quickly consolidated its position as the "leading force" in shaping national life, and concentrated all power in the hands of a few top party leaders. The Czechoslovak regimes of Gottwald, Zapatocky, and Novotny remained in power by employing all the techniques at the disposal of a modern totalitarian state—intimidation and terror, propaganda, and regulation of the political, economic, and cultural life of the people. In contrast to most of the Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe, the death of Stalin in 1953 did not lead to a relaxation of the tight grip the Czechoslovak regime held on almost every aspect of national life. The defeatism of the people, the relatively high standard of living, and the economic concessions granted by the regime all contributed to delaying pressures for liberalization.

In July 1960 the Communist regime proclaimed Czechoslovakia a "socialist state," the second in the world after the U.S.S.R., and renamed the country the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. At the same time the Communists wrote a new "socialist" constitution and made far-reaching administrative changes. These changes called, inter alia, for the country to complete the "construction of a mature socialist society" by 1965, at which time it was supposed to begin the transition into a "Communist society." To the sophisticated, urban Czechs, memories of democracy, and even of the relatively benign Austrian hegemony, made the Communist dictatorship increasingly difficult to endure. The ill feeling which the Slovaks had toward the Czechs and toward Czech domination of the central government created further problems on the domestic scene.

By late 1962, economic failure exacerbated by political discord encouraged liberal forces inside and outside the Communist Party to demand the liberalization or de-Stalinizataion which had begun many years earlier in the U.S.S.R. and some other Eastern European Communist countries. After considerably pressure, the regime of Antonin Novotny was forced to modify its policies and permit a gradual "thaw."

But even limited liberalization had adverse effects on the party. It permitted, for example, the feud between party liberals and conservatives to be brought into the open. Meanwhile, deep-seated differences within the Communist leadership, long just below the surface, were being aired publicly, often impeding the formulation or implementation of effective policies needed to deal with a number of urgent economic and social problems. Inertia seemed to grip the leadership, and this in turn led to crippling confusion and the interparty crisis of the final months of 1967.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2