Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/49

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'''FIGURE 13. River police patrol the Danube (U/OU)'''

2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

There is little question that the political shakeups in Prague since 1968 have had traumatic effects on the security and intelligence services, in terms of both organizational changes and personnel turnover. The rapid changeover from the conservative, quasi-Stalinist hierarchy under Novotny, to Dubcek's liberal one, and to Husak's neoconservative structure almost certainly caused major disruptions in effectiveness and gaps in intelligence functions, some of which may well remain in 1973.

Nevertheless, these services, under the watchful eye of the party, dealt effectively with the disturbances that marked the first postinvasion year, and have been able since then to maintain order and ferret out the sporadic, though persistent, instances of dissident activity. This strongly suggests that Husak's internal security apparatus is fully able, and can be relied on, to suppress or contain openly dissident elements, cope effectively with either localized rioting or, with the aid of the militarized units under the Ministry of Interior, with large-scale disturbances. It can also be assumed that the effectiveness of Czechoslovak internal security forces is certainly augmented by the psychological effect on the population on the threat implicit in the presence of Soviet military forces that have been on Czechoslovak territory since August 1968.

For its part, the Husak regime has tried to carry out a policy which would reinvest the security services with the means and the authority to enforce domestic tranquility without recourse to the terror tactics of the early 1960's. The police occasionally have been brutal, but usually only when dealing with public demonstrations. Mass arrests have been made, although most suspects apparently have been released after only a short detention period. In August 1969 the police were granted emergency powers to deal with demonstrations and tough penal codes have been enacted to deal with a rise in crime, in part stimulated by the disorders and disruptions since August 1968.

The government has imposed severe travel restrictions, both on Czechoslovaks traveling abroad and on foreigners coming into the country. Vacation and student travel to Western countries has been drastically curtailed, largely to prevent defections. Czechoslovak diplomats have been put under tight travel restrictions since many of their colleagues defected in 1968 and 1969. Czechoslovak borders have from time to time been closed to Western journalists and some newsmen have been expelled from the country. Western diplomats have occasionally had their travel prerogatives reduced.

G. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

There is a wealth of works on the political and social dynamics of Czechoslovakia both before and after the Communists came to power. Often parochial events in the country's history have later come to be seen as epitomizing trends that have had significant impact on the whole European scene.

This is true of the Czech-German rivalry within the beleaguered Czechoslovak state of the interwar period, and the self-image of the Czechs as sacrificial lambs on the altar of appeasement in 1938 and as the primary catalysts to World War II in Europe. It is also true in the failure of the democratic-Communist coalition in the 1945-48 period ending in the bloodless Communist coup, which, in turn, signaled the beginning of what has been termed the cold war.

Similarly, just as the ensuing history of Communist excesses in Czechoslovakia, the show trials and internecine bloodletting of the 1950-54 period epitomized what is known as the Stalinist era, so did Novotny's reluctance to engage in de-Stalinization lead to the eventual, virtually unconstrained release of idealistic—albeit socialist—political impulses during the 1968 "Prague Spring." The August 1968 invasion

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