Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/46

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

is a rigid educational system, made insipid and sterile through political discrimination and indoctrination. The restrictions placed in travel to the West have contributed to the malaise. In their own country, even Communist youth have been disillusioned by the harsh differences between socialist theory and socialist reality, and disturbed by seeing the "socialist revolution betrayed" by the Communist regime.

The youth have been more daring than their elders in demonstrating their dissatisfaction, being in the forefront of most active protests both before and after the 1968 reform era. They took advantage of regime-approved demonstrations such as those protesting U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam and the U.S.S. Pueblo affair to harass the Novotny regime. Czechoslovak young people have also been responsible for numerous riots, vandalism, work absenteeism, and "hooliganism representing acts of defiance to the Soviet occupation." In some cases the sons and daughters of pro-Communist working-class parents and of high-ranking regime officials have been among the more vocal dissidents.

Neither the peasantry nor the "favored" industrial workers have been satisfied with conditions in Czechoslovakia under the Communists. Passive resistance and chronic discontent in rural areas have been important factors in the failure of Czechoslovak agricultural production to meet planned goals. The most striking examples of opposition to Communist agricultural policies have come about because of the widespread refusal of young people to enter farming and the almost negligible recruitment of Communist Party members in the rural areas.

Industrial workers have also expressed dissatisfaction with their position, but they have lacked organization. Nevertheless, they have managed to demonstrate their opposition to the regime and its policies by a variety of means including slowdowns, absenteeism, evasion of regulations, poor quality or erratic production, willful negligence, theft, vandalism, and occasional strikes and demonstrations. Skilled workers who had once regarded communism as a more militant form of social democracy became disillusioned with the political repression and the nonfulfillment of promises of rapid improvement in their living conditions. Unskilled workers, once the firmest supporters of the Communists, have from time to time suffered great economic hardships and have resented the regime's economic policies such as "labor competition," the system of wage differentials, and rewards for "exemplary" work.

Economic crimes have also been a manifestation of popular dissatisfaction. Widespread smuggling, currency speculation, and theft, involving both employees and management, have vexed the regime, leading to periodic disciplinary campaigns.

Virtually all these manifestations of discontent, in general abeyance during the period of Dubcek's leadership, were renewed after Husak took office. The new regime was fully aware of the potential dissident threat, however, and moved quickly to quell demonstrations and other forms of active protest. The quiet passing of the second and subsequent anniversaries of the invasion, in contrast to the violence that accompanied the first, was adequate testimony to the efficiency of the regime's tough police tactics. Occasional roundups of potential troublemakers and prosecutions of "lawbreakers" still occur, but by 1973 overt public dissent was limited almost entirely to catcalls at pro-Soviet movies, political jokes, poor sales of party newspapers, and, as always, malingering.

A strong indicator of the limitations placed on Husak's power has been the shelving of his "reconciliation" campaign. His attempt to strike a bargain with those members of the deposed liberal community who had not violated law by overt acts of defiance was a key element in his early political program and the major issue setting him apart from the conservatives. "Reconciliation" involved exoneration of the thousands of Czechoslovaks who had supported the reform movement in exchange for their atonement and future cooperation with the party. The failure of "reconciliation" resulted just as much from the refusal of the party conservatives to actually put it into practice as it did from the refusal of the liberals, mostly intellectuals, to be bribed with jobs and social status. Where the more practical Husak could envision a tactical alliance with the liberals for the sake of "normalization," the conservatives could not. Conservative party members considered it beyond the pale to seek rapprochement with their countrymen who so recently had turned on them.

2. Subversion (S)

No sustained, organized subversion has been known to exist in contemporary Czechoslovakia. The initiatives taken by Dubcek in 1968 were intended to reform the country's leadership and policies by working within the ruling Communist Party, and involved no unconstitutional movement to overthrow either the government or the constitution. The innovations introduced by the Dubcek leadership were bound to alter the methods by which the government operated, but at no time was the Communist system of government challenged from without.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2