Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/45

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

military threat. As such, the regime appears a throwback to an earlier period in East European-Soviet relations. In other countries, the gradual process of political selection has produced new ruling elites that no longer bear the onus of having been directly installed by Moscow. Finally, Husak must rule over the one people in Eastern Europe who have a deeply rooted democratic tradition, and who tend to be highly educated and politically sophisticated regardless of social class. (U/OU)

While these factors would tend to introduce formidable destabilizing strains into the society, there are major countervailing factors that tend to balance if not outweigh them. Foremost is the Czech national characteristic of caution, innate sense of law and order, fear of violence, and basic unwillingness to persist championing a cause against unfavorable odds. This is most evident in the middle class which is more numerous in Czechoslovakia than in any other East European country except East Germany. Moreover, these attitudes are reinforced by the traditionally high living standards and consequent materialistic impulses of the majority. These impulses in fact, have been used by the Husak regime, which has, in the view of many dissident intellectuals, bribed the population away from subversive activity and into political apathy by supplying it with more consumer goods. Finally, there also exists a tendency toward "scapegoatism," in the particular need to blame certain elements in the society for past failures, that tends to divide the nation against itself and facilitates foreign overrule. As a result, some of the intellectual proponents of the 1968 reform period find themselves not only persecuted by the regime, but also ostracized by the people, who—perhaps not always consciously—blame them for both the 1968 "debacle" and for the subsequent prolonged suppression. The sum effect of these factors has been not to eliminate isolated acts of active resistance or the much more prevalent passive resistance, but to make both at most an embarrassment rather than a danger to the regime. (U/OU)

1. Discontent and dissidence (C)

The varied activities which the Communists are inclined to regard as subversive have usually represented a desire to bring about reforms rather than to overthrow the existing system. These protest activities have only occasionally resulted in rioting or individual acts of violence.

The popular dissidence that reached a peak in Czechoslovakia in the 1960's has been silenced by the military occupation but is no less extant than it was in 1967. Under Antonin Novotny, nearly every section of Czechoslovak society developed a deep-seated contempt for the Communists' heavyhanded methods of running the country, a contempt that even began to extend to Dubcek when the people felt his retreat from the Action Program was an unnecessary capitulation to the Soviets. Likewise, the Czechoslovaks have amply demonstrated their dislike of the Husak leadership, which openly acknowledges the difficulty it faces in gaining the popular support necessary to generate a renewed sense of national purpose.

Perhaps the most effective opposition group, prior to 1968, was the country's intellectual community. Non-Communists as well as disaffected or liberal Communist intellectuals united after 1962 in a bold campaign which forced significant cabinet changes in 1963 and compelled the party to reexamine many aspects of its policies. Speeches at the fourth congress of the Czechoslovak Writers Union in June 1967 intensified the intraparty crisis that eventually led to Novotny's fall.

Another social group critical of Czechoslovakia's internal political development has been the Slovak minority. Except for the short-lived Dubcek regime, under which the Slovaks gained considerable political power, the Communists have been no more successful in coping with Slovak demands for autonomy than their democratic predecessors. More outspoken and impulsive than the Czechs, the Slovaks were in the forefront of the campaign to liberalize and reduce party control. In questions concerning Slovakia—its voice in national matters, its share in the approved "histories" of the country, and its claim to Communist and non-Communist heroes—the Slovaks consistently defied the party until it granted at least partial satisfaction of their demands. Slovak dissension—like that of the small Hungarian, Gypsy, German, Ukrainian, and Polish minorities—was a constant irritant to the Communists and erupted occasionally in public demonstrations or interethnic clashes which belied Communist claims of having solved minority problems.

A third element of society that has caused considerable trouble to the Communists is the youth. During the two decades in which they have been in control, the Communists have failed to mold the country's youth into a dynamic social group responsive to the regime. Years of Communist indoctrination and isolation have not won over the young people, but rather have caused young workers, students, and farmers to resist, and eventually attack, the regime's policies. Czechoslovak youth, who have shared many of the grievances of their elders, have additionally had many of their own. Topping the list

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2