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probably unaware of the impending invasion, visited Prague the week before it took place. This development, along with other apparent manifestations of Prague's growing "alliance" with Romania and Yugoslavia in 1968 may have contributed to the Soviets' decision to invade. Hungary, which had reacted coolly to Dubcek's more adventuresome reforms, showed sympathy for the overall program. Both Hungary and Poland initially opposed the idea of Soviet military intervention to halt the "counterrevolution" in Prague but eventually were compelled to participate.

One of Husak's first decisions after the Soviet-led invasion was to accept the necessity of subordinating Czechoslovak foreign policy to Moscow. He apparently felt that only by alleviating Moscow's concern over Czechoslovakia's reliability in the Warsaw Pact could he gain control of domestic matters. The Soviets, initially wary of Husak, eventually gave him their official endorsement when he and other top Czechoslovak leaders visited Moscow in October 1969.

The most significant manifestation of Prague's subordination to Moscow in foreign matters was the signing in May 1970 of the new Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. This 20-year treaty endorsed the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which asserts Moscow's right to intervene in any country where Communist rule is threatened, and implicitly legitimized the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The treaty also implicitly obligated Czechoslovakia to assist the Soviet Union in case of a military confrontation with Communist China.

A determining element of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations is the presence of Soviet occupation troops in Czechoslovakia. As part of a concerted Soviet effort to lend a semblance of legality to the occupation, the Czechoslovak Government was forced to sign a status-of-forces agreement with the U.S.S.R. in October 1968. The pact called for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Soviet forces then occupying the country, and within 2 months the number of troops had been reduced to the 55,000-60,000 level. Under the agreement, an unspecified number of troops are to remain in the country "temporarily but are not to interfere in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs. The Soviets also agreed to bear their own maintenance costs, to compensate Prague for material damage inflicted by their armed units, and to permit crimes committed by their troops to be prosecuted according to Czechoslovak laws.

Prague has shown some initiative in improving its relations with its East European neighbors. Husak's task was a formidable one in that his accession to power was received with considerable uncertainty by all Communist leaders. To the Romanians and Yugoslavs he personified the Soviet occupation, which to them was anathema. To the East Germans, Husak represented a political regime well short of the archconservative one they had hoped to see in Prague. The Hungarians were not long in coming out in favor of Husak and, like the Poles, preferred his leadership over a more Stalinist regime that could have strengthened conservative party elements in their own countries. In December 1969, after Hungarian party leader Kadar visited Prague to assess the situation for himself, the Husak regime stated explicitly that it had studied the Hungarian "solution" since the 1956 uprising and would adopt those measures applicable to Czechoslovakia.

By the end of 1970 the other Warsaw Pact countries had largely fallen in behind the Soviets in the latter's acceptance of the political status quo in Prague. Husak's middle-of-the-road domestic policies and his demonstrated ability to maintain public order and the authority of the Communist Party had convinced his allies that Czechoslovakia no longer posed a threat, whether liberal or conservative, to their own nationalist interests. In addition, Husak has edged increasingly closer toward accepting the "fraternal aid" of the five invasion powers, finally thanking them for the action at the 14th Party Congress in May 1972. In October 1973, Husak himself finally visited Yugoslavia, and Federal Assembly chairman Indra made an official trip to Romania. By thus burying the hatchet with Eastern Europe's two maverick regimes who had vocally opposed the 1968 invasion, Prague demonstrated its fully regained diplomatic credentials in the area.

b. Relations with developed non-Communist states

Improved relations with the West, primarily for economic reasons, were sought even by the Novotny regime, but became a central feature of Dubcek's program in its early stages. Czechoslovak industry required modernization, and this could be financed only by selling more products in the West. In addition, Western technology and credits were essential if there were to be an easing of the economic stranglehold on the Czechoslovak economy which had been brought about by its compulsory integration with the economics of the other Communist countries, notably that of the U.S.S.R.

The Czechoslovaks' primary target for expanded trade was Western Europe, particularly West

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2