Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/41

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

'''FIGURE 12. Bohuslav Chnoupek, Minister of Foreign Affairs (C)'''

two other officials: Vasil Bilak, party secretary in charge of foreign relations, and Pavel Auersperg, head of the Central Committee's Department of International Affairs. All three men are conservatives and thoroughly loyal to Soviet interests.

a. Relations with the Communist world

The changing atmosphere of the 1960's brought shifts in Czechoslovakia's relations with other Communist countries, permitting an exchange of ideas which in turn had a liberalizing effect on Czechoslovak policies. To demonstrate flexibility, Party First Secretary Novotny began as early as 1963 to woo Yugoslavia and to indicate an interest in certain political and economic reforms initiated by the Yugoslavs, which had been frowned upon by Moscow. Even though much of this maneuvering was for the sake of improving Novotny's image at home, relations with Yugoslavia began to grow more friendly during the early and mid-1960's.

The heightened nationalism and "democratization" exhibited by the Czechoslovak Government in the mid-1960's, and the resultant tensions with the Soviet Union, led to a closer identity of interests with Romania, which had become the maverick of the Soviet bloc. The Novotny regime stopped well short of the independent "posturing" of Romania, however, and chose not to antagonize Moscow by appearing to sympathize with the Bucharest regime's more independent stance. Under Novotny, Czechoslovakia also drew closer to Poland and Hungary. Novotny seemed particularly conscious of the Hungarian regime's success in gaining popular support without sacrificing discipline or public order.

With orthodox "Stalinist" East Germany, however, relations began to deteriorate after 1963 as Pankow became openly hostile to Prague's liberalization and reform movement. No East European leader felt more threatened by Czechoslovakia's liberalization movement than Walter Ulbricht. It may have been his voice, in the marked absence of reassurances from Prague, that in August 1968 tipped the scales in favor of invasion.

The more nationalistic regime of Alexander Dubcek reasserted the right to formulate positions on "fundamental questions of international policy" that reflected the country's own national interests. The new leaders in Prague stressed that the main role of foreign policy was to "assist the process" toward a "truly democratic socialism." They were hoping to revitalize Czechoslovak foreign policy by attaining a more meaningful "equality" among their Soviet bloc allies, by assuming a greater and more influential role in bloc activities, and by expanding their political, economic, and cultural contacts with non-Communist countries.

During the early months of Dubcek's leadership, several of Czechoslovakia's allies were sympathetic to Prague's emphasis on national interests. Friendship treaties with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania were renewed, indicating that relations were still normal. By the summer of 1968, however, all of Czechoslovakia's allies had been taken aback by the sweeping nature of the Dubcek reforms. The Communist states, including Romania, looked with grave concern upon Dubcek's deliberate reduction of the authority of the Communist Party, which they feared might spark demands for a similar movement in their own countries. Dubcek's innovative approach to foreign policy also began to cause anxiety. In July 1968 the Czechoslovaks for the first time took a position on a vital international issue at variance with that of their Communist allies; they refused to back East German efforts, supported by the Soviets, to hinder access to West Berlin. Although Prague was eventually pressured into supporting the Soviet view of the situation, the incident underlined the growing divergence between Prague's stand on certain foreign policy issues and that of its allies.

By the time of the invasion, most of Czechoslovakia's allies were faced with the tough decision of how to react to Czechoslovakia's reform program. Romania especially appeared to be in a quandary, supporting in principle Dubcek's insistence on "self-determination" as the basic ingredient of foreign policy. Romanian President Ceaucescu, who was

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