Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/37

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

policy line has tended to appeal, if subconsciously, to the petit bourgeois impulses of much of the population, especially the Czechs, whose national character places great store on public order, political caution, general inconspicuousness of one's public image, and material welfare. These qualities, by contrast, are disdained by the generally intellectual elements who under Dubcek succeeded briefly in firing the latent idealism of the people, and who now have once again been relegated to the political dustbin. More than this, however, Husak has gradually succeeded in portraying the sporadic attempts of the reformers to resist "normalization" and keep the 1968 spirit alive as counterproductive to the interests of the general public. In this way he has managed to some extent to revive the people's tendency to blame idealistic intellectuals for the country's fate, and to turn to those whose program is portrayed as being true to the "common sense realism" traditionally considered the highest virtue by much of the population. Implicitly, Husak thus points at himself and his policies as embodying this virtue, with his critics, on both sides of the political spectrum, as disrupters of a course which has historically enabled the Czechoslovak people to survive "hard times."

What mix of self-delusion, apathy, resignation, and lingering hope makes up the public's willingness to accept—though not support—Husak's line is a moot question. The majority of the people clearly do not believe that there is any change for meaningful opposition to the current situation, and their national temperament makes them look askance at what they regard as quixotic gestures by an enfeebled intellectual minority. Given this popular posture, Husak indeed appears to many as the ultimate practitioner of "Schweikism," that typical willingness by Czechoslovaks to conserve their energy through sycophancy to superior to power, while awaiting more propitious circumstances for assessing their interests.

1. Domestic

For the first 18 months of his tenure, Husak was preoccupied with establishing his own legitimacy as party leader, and he had little opportunity to plan, much less implement, domestic policies. It was not until the autumn of 1970 that Husak appeared confident that his remedial efforts to stabilize the political situation within the Communist Party and in the country had proceeded to the point where he could commit the party's full energies to constructive domestic programs. Those administrative decisions that had been taken were piecemeal and generally of a negative character, resulting for the most part from the displacement of liberal administrators and functionaries by conservatives who often were left to determine their own course of action free of centralized coordination. The common denominator of the regime's activities seems to have been the silencing of reformers, which it regarded as a prerequisite to drawing up its own agenda.

Husak did, however, provide a broad outline of his plans in June 1970. Addressing the Central Committee's plenary session, he reviewed the party's progress in reversing the "deviations" of the liberalization program and traced what he considered to be the party's future tasks. He emphasized that the party's first priority, following the defeat of the "rightwing," was to reeducate the population into accepting the leading role of the party in the country's affairs and to convince the public that only through dedicated cooperation with the party could the country's problems be solved.

Tactically, this effect was to entail the full use of the communications media, particularly party periodicals. By early 1971, all important media posts had been filled with party men. A system of party schooling, concentrating on Marxist-Leninist ideology and "social awareness" was instituted, and party functionaries were appointed on the basis of their initiative in promoting party policies. Party members and the public alike have since been subjected to a prolonged hard-sell campaign incorporating these and other methods, but it seems to have barely dented the well-tempered cynicism of the Czechoslovaks.

The regime's propaganda campaign has been essentially a carrot and stick approach, described by Husak as a policy of "differentiation." On the one hand, the party has offered leniency to those who in effect recognized that the hopes kindled in 1968 were not to be fulfilled and were willing to accept the reality of the existing situation and cooperate. On the other hand, those who persisted in criticizing the regime and pressed for unacceptable reforms have been firmly dealt with.

Husak has not tolerated public demonstrations of discontent. Embarrassed by the massive demonstrations in August 1969, which threatened to induce further Soviet intervention, Husak ordered harsh security measures, including mass arrests of potential troublemakers and brutal tactics by the police to disperse crowds. The quiet passage of the invasion anniversaries since then has been viewed as an important success by the regime, which has put great stock in the reversion by the people to their traditional sense of public order and discipline.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2