Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/30

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

serves Soviet purposes to maintain a potential for criticism by proxy. In short, while Husak seems secure from attack by the hardliners, he has not been allowed to removed them from the leadership.

Vasil Bilak, who was accused of collaboration in August 1968, has long been regarded as a Soviet favorite and a man posing the most easily discernible threat to Husak. Bilal is a member of the Presidium and is the Party Secretary in charge of international relations, although there have been reports that he has, perhaps coincident to the transfer of Indra to the largely ceremonial position of head of parliament, assumed a greater role in the formulation of domestic policies. In late February 1972 rumors circulated in Prague that Husak had made a secret trip to Moscow to complain about Bilak's domestic activities and that Bilak, in turn, was summoned by Brezhnev for disciplining. On 19 April, Bilak publicly disclaimed any differences between himself and Husak and gave high praise to the party leader, lending credibility to the rumors. In view of Husak's reputation as a master tactician and of the acrimony which has existed between the two men for years, Husak can be expected to keep a particularly close watch over Bilak's activities.

It is generally conceded, even by Husak's bitter critics, that in intellect and ability he far exceeds other members of the Czechoslovak leadership. He appears thus far to have prevented any single Czechoslovak leader from seriously challenging his position. While there have been rumors of ultraconservative plots to unseat him, the Soviets—who retain the final say on who should rule in Czechoslovakia—would hardly permit his ouster at this time, if only because they would not want a leadership struggle in Prague which could affect Soviet policies of detente. Husak has given Brezhnev a stable, if sullen, Czechoslovakia, which has in many respects resumed its role of "model satellite." Should Husak falter or become a liability, however, Moscow could undoubtedly replace him.

3. Communist Party organization and membership (S)

As part of its goal of democratization, the Dubcek regime in 1968 launched a comprehensive review of the organization, structure, and delegation of responsibilities among the organs of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC). The most important of the pending changes was the division of the party into two separate but equal components: The Czech Communist Party and the Slovak Communist Party. This division was to have paralleled the federalization of the government. Few of the proposed party reforms survived the invasion, however, and today federalization of the party is a dead letter.

The basic rules governing the organization of the party in 1973, together with its functions and membership requirements, are contained in the party statutes adopted at the 14th Party Congress in May 1971. Among the statutory changes introduced at the 14th Congress was the change in name for the top party position from First Secretary to Secretary General, and the lengthened interval between congresses from 4 to 5 years. In both instances the KSC clearly followed the Soviet model.

Like other Communist parties, the KSC is theoretically guided by the principle of democratic centralism. The main theoretical elements of democratic centralism include election of all party leaders, strict party discipline, the accountability of higher party bodies to lower bodies, the indisputable and compulsory nature of decisions once made, and the subjection of the minority to the majority.

Husak has clearly concentrated political power in the KSC top leadership. Nevertheless, the repeated turnover of personnel and changes in policy since 1968 have left unclear important aspects of its day-to-day management and working relationships among the top leaders and party organs. Husak clearly dominates policymaking, but it is difficult to assess the degree of support he enjoys among the hierarchy or the extent to which he has delegated administrative responsibilities to his colleagues in the Secretariat and Presidium. The public image of party unity that KSC leaders evinced during the 14th Party Congress does not hide the fact that now dormant ideological and personal differences could have a significant effect on party administration.

Subordinate to the national party is the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) which serves as a transmission belt for promulgating directives of the KSC throughout the respective regional, district, and local party organs in Slovakia. The Central Committee Bureau for the conduct of party work in the Czech Lands (Czech party bureau), established in November 1968 as a stopgap measure pending the outcome of party federalization plans, was dropped at the 14th Party Congress. The organizational hierarchy of the Communist party system in Czechoslovakia is shown in Figure 10.

a. Central organs

The KSC Party Congress, which now convenes every 5 years, is in theory the supreme organ of the party. In practice, however, the congress has merely served to ratify the policies fixed by the top leadership.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2