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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

the ouster of all who had any connection with the Dubcek regime or who had objected to the Soviet invasion. Willingness to approve of the invasion became the touchstone of a member's "reliability."

As the purge progressed, it became clear that the dogmatists would be unable to prevail. Most of the local party commissions conducting the reliability interviews refused to utilize the heavily slanted criteria presented by the hardline commissioners in Prague. In some instances, the interviews turned into fiascos, with more aggressive party members either refusing to cooperate or launching counterattacks on the commission members. Many members simply resigned in disgust, while others cajoled their interviewers into renewing party cards.

The result of the purge was a decided victory for Husak. Some 300,000 party members were ousted which, in addition to the 200,000 believed to have resigned prior to the purge, left a membership of about 1,200,000. The bulk of those removed were liberals who had supported the Dubcek reform program and who had refused to recant their sins and follow the new party line. The intellectual group was the hardest hit by the purge, followed by officials of the central government, especially those in positions that called for dealing with foreigners, because such posts were now judged to be "sensitive."

By the summer of 1970 Husak evidenced a growing confidence in his ability to head off conservative pressures and to guide the party as he saw fit. The party simultaneously published a preliminary interpretation of Dubcek's role in the reform movement, describing him not as the principal villain behind the liberalization process but as the dupe of "antisocialist forces." Dubcek's tenure was depicted as an aberration, brought on by an overemphasis in late 1967 on party unity when the true exercise of Leninist criteria would have resulted in the selection of a more qualified and forceful man. Party spokesmen, nevertheless, have consistently defended Novotny's removal as a legitimate move toward correcting the numerous problems that faced the country.

This theme was developed further in December 1970 when the Central Committee approved the regime's official definition of the "lessons" to be learned from the Dubcek and late Novotny periods. The document, published in early 1971, is intended to serve as a model and warning to other Communist regimes faced with potential reformist pressures.

The uneventful second anniversary of the invasion in August 1970 was touted by the regime as proof that "normalization" had been a success, and Husak seemed to be confident enough of his own position to call for convocation in May 1971 of the long-delayed Party Congress.

The 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, held in Prague on 25-29 May, formally marked the end of one phase of Czechoslovak history and the beginning of another. The congress outwardly held out little hope for early relaxation, moderation, and national reconciliation. There was in fact little solace to be gleaned from congress proceedings for purged Communist reformers and the non-Communist population. Several changes in the amended party statutes (such as the abolition of the Czech Party Bureau) had the effect of eroding still further what little remained of federalization and of tying the Czechoslovak party closer to its Soviet model. The overall effect of the amendments, moreover, strengthened central party control and discipline over the membership.

The Soviet rationale for the invasion—an act of "selfless international assistance" intended to save socialism in Czechoslovakia and carried out in response to the "appeals" of leading Czechoslovak party-state officials—was enshrined as party dogma. Husak, who is on record as initially opposing the invasion, expressed his gratitude and thanked Brezhnev for his role in it. Husak's reversal, dictated apparently by political expediency, merely contributed to the atmosphere at the congress, which glorified all things Soviets. The few personnel changes that took place in the party hierarchy seemingly strengthened the pro-Soviet, hardline cast of the Presidium—at the expense of the more moderate position generally associated with Husak.

On balance, the congress stressed the collective character of party authority and underscored the fact that Husak would continued to pay for his preeminence with fundamental compromises with his conservative colleagues. Although a show of cohesiveness and unity was apparent—factionalism was in fact formally proscribed by fiat—Husak was not permitted by the Soviets to have a leadership constellation of his own choosing even if he were otherwise able to do so.

Since the congress Husak has secured his position both with the Soviets and his internal critics. He obtained wholesale endorsement of his course—and the Order of Lenin—from Brezhnev when the latter visited Prague in February 1973, the 25th anniversary of the Communist coup. Internally, his position as first among equals is unchallenged, although it apparently

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2