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 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

belief that his Slovak "nationalism" and his authoritarianism would work to their advantage. The Russians may also have believed that, if necessary, it would be a relatively simple matter to replace the cautious and pragmatic Husak who did not command the intense loyalty and support of most Czechoslovaks.

Husak was immediately preoccupied with establishing his own authority in the party, a delicate task in view of the bitter conflict between the liberal, centrist, and conservative factions. A struggle soon began between Husak and party conservatives for control. There were substantial numbers of conservatives in the party hierarchy, including Lubomir Strougal, Vasil Bilak, and Alois Indra who, although opposed to the course the 1968 reform program had taken and to a large degree victimized by it, were able to retain a precarious hold on their positions until the invasion. Subsequently supported by the Soviets, who were anxiously awaiting a new Czechoslovak leadership, the conservatives gained a new lease on life. Immediately following Husak's ascendancy, conservatives leaders began voicing opposition to Husak's relatively restrained policies.

It was clear from Husak's speeches that he held little sympathy for many of the conservatives' demands, such as a wholesale purge of the party and political trials. His tenuous domestic position, however, and his need to convince the Soviets that he was the proper man to head the country's "normalization" program depended on a modicum of conservative support. To hold conservative criticism to a minimum he was forced to grant them numerous concessions. Many of Dubcek's reforms were slowed or reversed. Increasing numbers of conservative and dogmatic hardliners began finding their way into important party and government positions. The press emerged as a battleground between Husak supporters and the dogmatists over key issues, such as how energetically to purge the Dubcek reformers.

As the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion approached, however, it became clear that a major test of Husak's ability to maintain domestic stability was approaching. Antiregime and anti-Soviet incidents increased, generating a volatile atmosphere in the country. Moscow manifested considerable uneasiness over the situation, and made thinly veiled threats of military intervention if Czechoslovak security forces were unable to maintain order. The Soviets' failure openly to support Husak heightened popular fears that they were seeking a more repressive regime. Continuing economic difficulties, highlighted by worsening morale in the factories, contributed to the general malaise.

Large-scale demonstrations occurred following the first anniversary of the invasion. The regime prevented extensive violence, however, by tight security measures which included emergency security legislation, massive preventive arrests, and, occasionally, brutal police tactics. Husak's willingness to use force earned him much-needed Soviet approval, conveyed through an appreciative Soviet press and a belated Order of Lenin award for his wartime efforts in Slovakia.

Nevertheless, the demonstrations were embarrassing to the regime and it left Husak little choice but to launch a nationwide purge of liberals, which he had previously eschewed. During a Central Committee plenum in September, Husak announced that the purge would affect the party, government, and social organizations with emphasis on local party organizations. He stopped short of justifying the invasion despite the urgings of the conservatives, but his remarks pleased Moscow, because they were a quantum leap from his previous ambivalence. It was at the September plan that Dubcek lost his remaining official positions in the Party Presidium and his chairmanship of the Federal Assembly.

The Czechoslovak Central Committee plenum scheduled for January 1970 was expected to be a major test for Husak in the leadership struggle. After it was over, however, in terms of personnel appointments and party policies, it was clear that neither Husak nor the conservatives could achieve more than a standoff. Within the top party organs, Husak clearly held his own. The three remaining liberals in the Presidium, Oldrich Cernik, Karel Polacek, and Stefan Sadovsky, were removed, as was expected. Whatever ground Husak may have been compelled to yield as a result of these appointments was more than regained by the transfer of Lubomir Strougal from Czech party boss to federal Premier, thus removing Strougal from his political base in the party. In addition, Husak named moderates to head the Czech and Slovak party organizations, respectively.

Perhaps the most threatening development at the January plenum was the appointment of a predominantly hardline commission to implement the party membership card exchange program. This program was designed to purge the party membership of liberals but, if carried to the extremes the hardliners were demanding, threatened to erode Husak's support.

The dogmatists, motivated in part by the Soviets, sought a drastically reduced membership, leading a small, highly centralized and disciplined elite to rule without the encumbrances of an unwieldy party structure and membership. Some of them demanded

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2