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liberals who attacked him for bowing to Soviet desires. Both felt that he was permitting the conservatives to enhance their political positions. The conservatives, for their part, pressed Dubcek to move faster to satisfy Soviet demands. Rivalry between Czech and Slovak leaders sharpened over the imminent implementation of losing their traditional prerogatives and the Slovaks complaining that they would still be dominated by the more numerous Czechs on the basis of "majority rule."

Czechoslovak leaders also disagreed over the status-of-forces agreement which they felt constrained to sign with the Soviets in October in Prague. Although the pact called for the removal of the bulk of the Soviet occupation troops by mid-December 1968—an actual reduction to about 60,000—it also gave a semblance of legality to the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in the country. In sum, the Soviet hope to erode Dubcek's popular support seemed to be working.

By late December, the Dubcek leadership had begun to lose some of its drive as a result of indecision and the competing demands of the various factions. The liberals were attempting to save the remnants of the reform program while the "realists" or the centrists were trying to reconcile the demands of the population with those of the Soviet Union. The pro-Soviet conservatives, meanwhile, were seeking to develop an opposition bloc in the Central Committee as a springboard to power. At the same time, Soviet officials were making a concerted offer to expand their contacts with Czechoslovaks at all levels of the party and government, hoping to persuade middle and lower level officials to support the conservative cause. Dubcek's political position had rapidly deteriorated by early 1969, enabling the Soviets to seek out a more amenable successor. In April of that year Dubcek was forced to step aside in favor of Gustav Husak.

c. Husak and the return to normalcy

Gustav Husak's rise to power began with his assignment, in April 1968, to lead the Slovak fight for federalization. The campaign led to heated disputes with the Czech leaders and, although the Slovaks seemed headed for defeat on the issue, Husak reemerged as an influential national political figure.

Husak made his mark with the Soviets immediately following the invasion. He was a member of President Svoboda's delegation to Moscow to negotiate the release of Dubcek and the other leaders who had been taken prisoner. During the talks, Husak argued cogently and forcefully; he apparently impressed his Soviet counterparts who began a dialog with him that has continued to the present.

Husak had also established a record acceptable to the Soviets and most of his party colleagues on the reform programs. While he championed federalization and many of the "democratic" reforms that went with it, he had been critical of several "incorrect views" incorporated in the Action Program.

Husak's increasing influence at home won him election to the Presidium and Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the "illegal" 14th Party Congress conducted secretly in the shadow of Soviet guns on 22 August. Following his return to Czechoslovakia from Moscow, Husak dominated the "extraordinary" Slovak Party Congress 26-29 August and was elected First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party.

Shortly thereafter Husak delineated his policy of "realism" and became the foremost spokesman for "normalization"—broad compliance with Moscow's demands—as the only possible course in the face of military occupation and the threat of violent repression. Husak's apparent transformation from a nationalist to an uncompromising supporter of "normalization" appears to have been entirely pragmatic. His stress on the bilateral character of the Moscow Agreement suggests that he believed the Soviets would make no significant concessions to Prague until their demands had been met.

The strong leadership exercised by Husak in the aftermath of the invasion—Dubcek appears to have relied heavily on him—and his dialog with numerous Russian visitors led to widespread speculation as early as September 1968 that he was being groomed as Dubcek's successor. Gradually, Husak achieved greater prominence while Dubcek faded into the background. The anti-Soviet rioting triggered by Czechoslovakia's ice hockey victory over the Soviet Union in March 1969 embroiled the Czechoslovak leadership in its most serious crisis after the invasion. The Russians apparently demanded Dubcek's ouster and the installation of new leaders who could exercise effective control over the population. Husak was instrumental in organizing a new regime whose members were more acceptable to the Soviets. Husak was subsequently nominated for the post of party chief by Dubcek, and he received the overwhelming support—often for conflicting reasons—of the members of the Central Committee on 17 April 1969.

Moscow's role in Husak's ascendancy is not entirely clear, but the Soviet leaders appear to have accepted him on the basis of his strength in Prague and their

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2