Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/25

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

'''FIGURE 8. Alexander Dubcek—the happy face of socialism, 1968 May Day parade (U/OU)'''

symbolized that synthesis of socialism and humanism which many of them erroneously believed would ensue after the 1948 coup. In one sense, therefore, 1968 seemed to wipe clean the Stalinist slate and begin anew. This factor contributed to the tremendous release of political energy that characterized the Dubcek era.

Despite inadequate time for thorough preparation and a bitter behind-the-scenes struggle waged by the conservatives, the Action Program was well underway by early summer of 1968. In quickly freeing the mass media and making substantial personnel changes in government and party organs, the program strengthened Dubcek's popular and party position. His appointments were designed to appeal to the broadest possible range of the party membership and population. He concentrated on replacing the old guard conservative ideologists with younger technical experts anxious to implement sweeping economic and political reforms. Dubcek also sought to strengthen the representation of particular interest groups such as farmers, intellectuals, and national minorities.

Inevitably, frictions between interest groups emerged. Conservatives, both inside and outside the party, opposed Dubcek's changes for ideological regions and for fear of losing their positions. Progressives began to urge immediate and more sweeping reform measures. Czechs and Slovaks engaged in a debate over the steps required to federalize the government structure and the varying interpretations of the idea of "equality."

But once the Soviet Union in the summer in 1968 intensified its pressure on Dubcek to modify his reform program, competing interest groups began to unify around the leadership on the basis of patriotism. As the pressures increased, popular attitudes became increasingly hostile toward the Soviet Union and forged a strong bone between the liberal party leaders and the people. Dubcek, President Svoboda, and other leaders became national heroes after standing up to the Soviets during the confrontation between the Czechoslovak Party Presidium and the Soviet Party Politburo in July 1968 at Cierna nad Tisou near the Soviet border. A subsequent meeting between Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders in Bratislava seemed publicly amiable, but in fact may have represented Dubcek's last chance to moderate his course.

Dubcek either failed to recognize or ignored the warnings. In response, the Soviet leadership, already distrustful of Dubcek's reforms and fearful that they would eventually lead to Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the socialist camp, disrupt the political and economic unity of the Warsaw Pact nations, and infect the other East European countries and the U.S.S.R. itself, ordered Soviet troops and Warsaw pact forces from Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria into Czechoslovakia on the night of 20-21 August 1968 (Figure 9).

The ability of the Dubcek leadership to remain in power for some 8 months after the entry of Soviet troops can be attributed to the unprecedented wave of national unity that the invasion precipitated. It even propelled a number of prominent conservatives, who opposed the reform program, into the Dubcek camp. The immediate aim of the Soviet Union was political stability and, after failing to install a puppet regime, the Soviets realized that if the Czechoslovak leadership were deposed by force, the result might be open rebellion. The Soviet leaders decided to let the Dubcek regime remain in power but at the expense of the reform programs which were to be drastically curtailed. Moscow reasoned that Dubcek could eventually be reduced to a puppet or his popular support could be eroded to the point where he could be removed without creating a stir.

The ground swell of public support for the government enabled the Dubcek leadership initially to weather enormous Soviet pressures, including the infamous "inquisition" of Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and others in Moscow from 23 to 26 August, which included physical maltreatment, as well as threats of

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2