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for an easing of restrictions on creativity in many aspects of the intellectual and cultural life of the nation. The Slovaks commenced a bold drive to regain some degree of autonomy and to rectify past injustices perpetrated by the central government. Stimulated to greater efforts, the liberal faction among the Communists began to exercise genuine influence in party affairs.

In many instances, the demands of the Czech and Slovak party liberals initially coincided. In time, however, traditional Czech-Slovak animosities reemerged as a crucial problem, and combined with a growing popular awareness and involvement to add to the instability. By late 1963, Novotny himself appeared in danger of being toppled.

By early 1964, however, Novotny seemed to have decided on tactics that would enable him to restore order and reconsolidate his power. One significant compromise was his decision in 1966 to bring into the party a number of younger, more liberal members to offset the influence of the dogmatists who were hindering economic reforms. The newcomers, who comprised half of the Central Committee, quickly became discouraged with Novotny's dilatory approach toward reform and considered him an impediment to meaningful liberalization. The intensification of differences between the liberals and conservatives in the party became so acute that by mid-1967 a stalemate in leadership resulted. A number of serious problems, notably the continuing decline in the economic growth rate, could no longer be concealed or rationalized.

The regime's problems were significantly heightened by its inability to control or to achieve rapport with the intellectual community. Czechoslovak youth also contributed to the pressures for change and became a force which the regime could not ignore. During demonstrations in October and November 1967 protesting poor living conditions in their Prague dormitories, students were badly mishandled by the police. This, and a number of other political misadventures in which the regime was culpable, served to magnify intraparty confusion.

When the Central Committee met in a plenary session in October 1967, Novotny's position was in serious jeopardy. Encouraged by his apparent vulnerability, Slovak leaders launched a bold and personal attack against him, suggesting that it was time for collective leadership and that the next President ought to be a Slovak. Novotny was able to postpone discussion of the leadership question until December, but throughout the period be continued to lose support at all levels of the party.

Soviet apprehensions about events in Czechoslovakia became apparent in the final weeks of 1967. Several delegations from the U.S.S.R. visited Prague in late November and early December to sign bilateral agreements and to assess the state of the economy and the extent of unrest among intellectuals and youth. Soviet party chief Brezhnev, at the urging of Novotny and the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, made a sudden visit to Prague on 8-9 December to discuss the situation in the party leadership, but reportedly refused to be drawn into the quarrel on the ground that it was an internal matter. Although the Soviets had previously sought in various ways to bolster Novotny's position, it was obvious that Brezhnev, at this point, was more interested in stability than in Novotny's personal fortunes. Regardless of the circumspect role played by Brezhnev, many Czechoslovaks resented his presence and regarded it as unwarranted interference in Czechoslovak affairs.

The Central Committee met in a heated but inconclusive session between 19 and 21 December, during which Novotny attempted to intimidate his adversaries by threatening to use the army against them. Some of Novotny's close associates attempted a military coup which was foiled by an alert general. When the Central Committee sessions were resumed in January, Novotny was ousted as the Party First Secretary and was replaced by Dubcek. Novotny still retained the Presidency, however, as well as his seat on the Party Central Committee and its Presidium.

After a succession of political setbacks, the fate of the Novotny regime was sealed in February 1968, when Czechoslovak Army General Jan Sejna defected to the United States. Because of Sejna's close relations with Novotny, the defection caused a sensation and led to allegations of Sejna's corruption and participation in military coup plotting on Novotny's behalf. There were widespread demands from within the party for Novotny's retirement from political life. Novotny refused to step down despite Dubcek's urging, but in March was forced from the Presidency and the Party Presidium.

b. The Dubcek era

Alexander Dubcek (Figure 8) and his colleagues rapidly attained popularity once they had launched their comprehensive reform program in April 1968. This Action Program was clearly designed to synthesize communism with basic democratic principles and promised profound changes in virtually every sector of Czechoslovak society. To many Czechoslovak Communists whose naive idealism was dashed by the years of Stalinist oppression. Dubcek

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2