Page:NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2.pdf/21

 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2

federal Supreme Court were removed and politically conservative judges were appointed to succeed them. Under a hardline minister of justice, numerous judges within the Czech judiciary were replaced. Efforts have since been made to fill hundreds of vacant judgeships, and to speed up prosecutions, which fell behind in 1968-69.

Husak had long publicly pledged that there would be no return to the harsh repressive judicial practices of the Stalinist era, and that punitive political trials would not be held. His determination on this score, however, was solely whittled away by pressure from party extremists as well as by the sometimes audacious political dissent by some of the ousted reformers of 1968. In 1972 a number of trials were held with many former reformers in the dock, although they were technically charged only with anti-state political activity since the 1968 invasion.

The pressures that led to the trials also contributed to significant and harsh amendments to the legal codes enacted by the Federal Assembly in April 1973. The changes affected the codes of 1961, as amended in 1965, and put on the books some provisions which were even harsher than those of the Novotny era. For example, military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians in a wide range of generally ill-defined crimes involving "state secrets." The amended codes also virtually eliminated the hard-won rights of the defense with respect to its participation in the investigative process and access to evidence. Moreover, the search-and-seizure powers of the police (though long exercised in practice) were expanded and written into law. Finally, most criminal sentences were increased, and provisions were made for ex post facto increase in sentences already being served if the inmate refused to cooperate. Refusal to undertake overtime work (which may total as much as 280 hours a year) or refusal to eat, i.e., engaging in a hunger strike, is now punishable by as much as 1 year added to the inmate's original sentence.

C. Political dynamics

Political life in Czechoslovakia is, by virtue of popular alienation from the regime, even more insulated from domestic issues than is the case in neighboring East European countries; it consists essentially of factional party infighting, with virtually all serious candidates for positions of authority angling for support from the ultimate arbiter, the Soviet Union. A leadership cable of instilling a sense of national purpose has been conspicuously lacking since the Soviet-led invasion in 1968 and the ouster of the Dubcek government. Governmental instability has been aggravated by the economic problems facing the nation. The events of the past several years have demoralized the Czechoslovaks who, for the most part, appear to have "given up." The popular esteem enjoyed by the political leaders is in inverse proportion to the degree of their commitment to Moscow, the sine qua non for an assured future for an aspiring politician. (U/OU)

Knowing that little can change without the approval of Moscow, the Czechoslovak people ignore the maneuverings of the party except inasmuch as this results in policies that could affect the national welfare of the population. By 1973, the Husak regime appeared fairly secure and stable in having obtained Soviet endorsement of its "normalization" policies, and having gained a modicum of popular acceptance if not support. (U/OU)

The regime, however, continues to be faced with a paradox. While the leaders wish to engage popular energies in support of the party's program—particularly in the economic area—they realize that government stability depends on the continued political apathy of the masses. Instilling the lost sense of national purpose thus conflicts with the regime's sense of self-preservation, a conflict that is unlikely to be soon resolved. Meanwhile, most Czechoslovaks now pursue material well-being as a substitute for their repressed political impulses. (U/OU)

1. Assessment of the reform era (C)

The reform movement which brought Alexander Dubcek to power in 1968 convulsed the Czechoslovak Communist Party by reevaluating the theory and the practice of unitary party control of the state. Beginning in 1967 as a reaction to the inadequacies of the Novotny leadership, the movement rapidly evolved into a revolt against the traditional Soviet model of party-government-citizen relations. It was essentially a palace revolution led by senior, dedicated Communists, and supported in differing degrees by a wide range of party members. The thrust toward reform then, not unexpectedly, elicited the enthusiastic support of the citizenry as a whole. As the first effort by any ruling European Communist party to question its monopoly on power, the initiative set a precedent that, from the Soviet point of view, threatened to trigger the dissolution of Communist hegemony in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the reform era was accompanied by a maximum of fanfare and publicity, which, with its anti-Soviet thrust, further aroused the hostility of Moscow and other conservative Communist regimes.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2